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ABSTRACT
Eric R. Hansen: Constituency Diversity and Representation in the American States
(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey)
Over the last half century, Americans’ elected representatives have polarized along party lines.
Political scientists have studied how ideological divisions among citizens provide electoral incentives
for politicians to take extreme or partisan positions on the issues. However, Americans remain
politically divided along other demographic and socioeconomic cleavages separate from ideology.
This dissertation explains how social group cleavages among voters polarize American politics
through the electoral system. In short, candidates for office behave as strong partisans to unite
the support of various party-aligned social groups in diverse districts, but behave as independent,
constituency-minded representatives in districts where one social group constitutes a majority of
voters. I provide evidence using the case of racial and ethnic diversity in the American population
and bring to bear data describing voting populations, campaign behavior, and legislative behavior in
the 50 states. Chapter 1 introduces and provides context for the research. Chapter 2 distinguishes
ideological diversity from racial and ethnic diversity and provides evidence that ideological diversity
in the electorate results from differences in urbanization and education levels, not race. Chapter 3 uses
the text from campaign websites and a survey of state legislative candidates to show that candidates
campaigning in racially diverse districts behave as stronger partisans than candidates running in
racially homogeneous districts. Chapter 4 uses the roll-call voting records of state legislators to
demonstrate that representatives of more racially diverse districts vote more along party lines and
that legislatures representing racially diverse states tend to be more polarized. Chapter 5 lists the
broader conclusions of the work. This dissertation explains how social diversity contributes to the
polarization of American politics in the electorate and in government.
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CHAPTER 1: DIVERSITY, DISAGREEMENT, AND REPRESENTATION
By all accounts, elected officials in representative democracies are supposed to make decisions
that reflect the will of voters. Exactly what constitutes the will of voters is a question that perennially
vexes politicians, journalists, and scholars alike. The United States, like many other advanced
democracies, is a pluralistic society. Diversity in citizens’ political views and priorities complicates
representative government immensely. No one person shares the exact same set of opinions, values,
and life experiences with another person. Likewise, communities hold collective interests and shared
perspectives that differ from those held by other communities. When it comes to politics, Americans
simply disagree much of the time.
It nonetheless remains in the electoral interests of political officeholders to make decisions
representative of the views held by a majority of their constituents. Some lawmakers find this task
much easier than others. Lawmakers whose constituents largely share the same political opinions have
no problem determining what actions to take. Lawmakers whose constituencies are characterized by
deep social, racial, cultural, ideological, or economic divisions find representing their constituencies
much more challenging.
Governments have made efforts to strengthen the ties between citizens and elected officials
by working to include politically similar voters in the same constituencies through the districting
process. For example, many states direct lawmakers and redistricting commissions, when possible, to
preserve “communities of interest” when drawing boundaries. Though definitions of communities of
interest vary across states, the following definition from California’s Proposition 20, which introduced
redistricting reforms in 2010, is expansive and illustrative:
A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social
and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes
of its effective and fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those
common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and
those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same
transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same
1
media of communication relevant to the election process. Communities of interest shall
not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.
Of course, creating politically homogeneous districts comes with its own set of problems. Many
activists and government watchdog groups argue that gerrymandering, the drawing of politically
homogeneous districts to advantage one party in government, encourages extremism and polarization
among lawmakers (though many remain skeptical of this argument; see McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal 2009; Theriault 2008). State lawmakers and redistricting commissions must also follow
laws prohibiting racial gerrymandering, in which racial or ethnic minority voters are packed into
districts to dilute their political power (see Grofman and Handley, 1992).
Political science research has consistently concluded that lawmakers elected from diverse
constituencies have few incentives to be a representative for all voters in their districts. These studies
find that representatives of more diverse constituencies are less likely to side with the average district
voter and more likely to side with factions in the constituency or with their party’s leadership (Fiorina,
1974; Bailey and Brady, 1998; Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Ensley, 2012;
Goff and Grier, 1993). The logic can be posed in terms of a principal-agent problem. Lawmakers
serve as agents to multiple principals, which are all voters in their district. When the principals
agree on the course of action the agent should take, the agent has incentives to follow the principals’
direction to remain in her position. When principals disagree, the agent receives no clear direction
from the principals and is left with more personal discretion in decisionmaking.
Left unanswered is the question of what kinds of diversity produce the incentives for officeholders
to represent the interests of a faction within the constituency over the interests of the average
constituent. Social diversity comes in many forms. While scholars agree that ideologically diverse
districts elect officials who are less responsive to their average voter, it is unclear whether other forms
of social diversity have similar consequences for representation.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to expand scholarly understanding of how officehold-
ers understand political divisions among voters to include social group divisions. Broadly defined,
the term social group may refer to political groups like environmentalists or nonpolitical groups like
bowling leagues. However, I refer to social groups in the political sense throughout this dissertation.
For the purposes of political study, Karol (2009) defines a social group as “a self-aware collection of
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individuals who share intense concerns about a particular policy area” (9). This dissertation makes
four key theoretical assertions:
1. Politically meaningful diversity in the population occurs both in the ideological persuasions
and social group ties of voters.
2. Ideological diversity and group diversity are theoretically and empirically distinct.
3. Both ideological diversity and group diversity increases the incentives for elected officials to
make narrow appeals to factions in the district rather than to maximize their appeal among
constituents at large.
4. When political parties incorporate competing social groups into their coalitions, representa-
tives of diverse districts have greater incentives to act in line with their parties.
To understand how diversity in the social groups within constituencies influences representative
behavior, I assess how politicians campaign in and represent racially diverse districts. I use public
opinion and Census data to distinguish racially diverse populations from ideologically diverse
populations and to provide evidence that the two forms of diversity are unrelated. Then, I bring to
bear several sources of quantitative data to compare the behaviors of state-level politicians in racially
diverse districts to those in racially homogeneous districts. Before proceeding to summarize the
research, I discuss varying definitions of diversity in the scholarship on representation.
What Is Diversity?
What scholars mean when they refer to diversity1 in the constituency has varied over time.
As the wording of the California districting law above illustrates, various communities of citizens
hold distinct interests in sources of economic livelihood, lifestyles, community infrastructure, and
information sources. Various groups of citizens also share common religious beliefs, racial or ethnic
identities, expectations of relationship and family structures, or political orientations. Political
scientists have yet to nail down exactly which kinds of social diversity matter to political outcomes.
Earlier scholarship referred to diversity as variation in the demographic characteristics of a
population (Fiorina 1974; Bond 1983; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Morgan and Wilson
1990; Bailey and Brady 1998; see also Bishin, Dow, and Adams 2006). Aided by the development
of an index measure by Sullivan (1973), researchers used data on citizens’ housing, occupation,
1Scholars also frequently use the term “heterogeneity” to discuss this concept. I use the term diversity throughout the
dissertation to standardize language and avoid confusion.
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income, education, religion, and country of origin to conduct quantitative studies of the relationships
between diversity and the behavior of elected representatives. Notably missing was a component
capturing racial identity. Defining diversity in terms of demographics eventually fell out of fashion.
Scholars criticized the index for failing to account for the weight and direction of component variables
(Patterson and Caldeira, 1984). Researchers also criticized these studies for failing to limit component
variables to those holding political relevance, arguing that some demographic factors (for example
type of housing) did not meaningfully distinguish between voters with differing political persuasions
in the same way that other factors might (Koetzle, 1998).
In the last fifteen years, scholars have focused nearly exclusively on ideological diversity2
(Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Ensley, 2012; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012;
Kirkland, 2014). Their models predict that legislators in ideologically diverse districts can cultivate
winning majorities of voters by positioning themselves at the ideological extremes of the constituency.
In contrast, legislators in ideologically homogeneous districts must position themselves closer to the
median voter. Empirically, studies of ideological diversity departed from prior research by using
newly available large-N data sets to measure public opinion at the levels of states and congressional
districts. Some argued that demographic indices were simply poor proxies for ideological diversity,
which had always been the real variable of interest (Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope,
2010).
The ideological diversity approach has improved over the demographic diversity approach in
terms of the development of the theoretical arguments, the validity of the variables in measuring
an underlying construct, and the consistency of the results. However, ideological diversity studies
only capture one type of diversity relevant to elite behavior. Diversity in the constituency influences
the behavior of candidates and lawmakers in the extent to which it creates political and, especially,
partisan divisions that affect election outcomes (Koetzle, 1998).
What matters to politicians at the end of the day is whether or not a voter will cast a ballot
for them. Political support could come from ideologues, but it could also come from social group
members. Social groups share intense preferences on certain policy issues and vote for the parties or
2A variant of this line of research focuses on district complexity (Ensley, Tofias, and de Marchi, 2009; Wichowsky,
2012). The research finds that in districts where more citizens hold more ideologically cross-cutting issue positions,
incumbents remain in office longer. These studies are comparable in that they use public opinion data to predict how
political disagreements within constituencies influence legislative behavior.
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candidates that take the group’s preferred stances on those specific issues. Lawmakers and candidates
consider district voters as potential supporters or opponents based on their social group membership
(Fenno, 1978; Miler, 2010; Carsey, 2000).
Many social groups are already organized into party coalitions. In fact, the major parties form
majorities of voters by building coalitions of social groups (Bawn et al., 2012; Karol, 2009; Axelrod,
1972; Brooks and Manza, 1997). Parties take stances on issues to attract the support of social groups
that help them build electoral majorities (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Miller and Schofield, 2003).
Once elected to govern, the party presses a political agenda advancing the interests of the groups in
the coalition.
Voters often support the candidates of one party or the other due to their group ties, rather than
for ideological reasons. In fact, relatively few voters hold highly constrained ideologies such that
they hold only liberal or only conservative beliefs across issues (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse,
1964; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Zaller, 1992). Party support or party identification can serve as an
expression of group identity or social milieu (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Campbell
et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Achen and Bartels,
2016). Many Americans hold strong positions on single issues that are salient and important to them,
without subscribing to an overall ideology. When voters with an important issue priority find that
their party is out of line with that priority, some voters will switch parties (though others will simply
change their views to align with their party) (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Achen and Bartels, 2016).
Ideological diversity splits votes between partisan candidates, but group diversity also creates
partisan divisions. Candidates must take issue positions based on the ideology of voters, but must also
position themselves based on the social groups present in their district and how those social groups
align with the parties. Scholars should observe that diversity in the social group composition of
populations, especially where divisions between social groups align with partisan divisions, influence
candidate positioning.
Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Representation in the U.S.
Though I intend the claims I make about group diversity to be generalizable across different
kinds of social groups, I provide evidence focusing solely on the case of racial and ethnic groups
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in the United States. Issues of race and ethnicity have divided Americans since the founding of the
country. Those divisions persist in contemporary political debates. Elected as the United States’ first
black president in 2008, President Obama used his bully pulpit to draw attention to racial disparities
in the criminal justice system, healthcare, and education, and other areas of social life (though many
activists criticized Obama for not speaking more frequently on issues of race). In 2014, the police
killing of an unarmed black man, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri prompted nationwide
protests that helped to spur the creation of the Black Lives Matter movement. Then-presidential
candidate Donald Trump’s campaign promises in 2015 and 2016 to build a wall along the Mexican
border drew harsh and vocal criticism from opponents.
Stark partisan divisions on issues of race have contributed to the partisan polarization of American
voters along racial and ethnic lines, a trend that Cain and Zhang (2016) term “conjoined polarization.”
While African Americans have long voted as a solidly Democratic constituency, vote choice among
Latinos and Asian Americans has slowly drifted towards the Democratic presidential candidates
since the 1990s (Hajnal and Lee, 2011). Meanwhile, white voters have increasingly thrown their
support behind the Republican Party (Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015).
As a consequence of this trend, elites draw associations between racial or ethnic groups and
parties, often using voters’ race or ethnicity to infer their partisanship or vote choice. The conflation
of race and partisanship has potentially negative consequences for public policy, particularly in
decisions surrounding voting rights and redistricting where racial discrimination is prohibited by law
but partisan discrimination is not (Cain and Zhang, 2016). For example, two federal courts found in
the months after the 2016 election that state lawmakers in North Carolina and Texas illegally used
race as a factor in drawing district boundaries to give Republican candidates an electoral advantage.3
Despite their contemporary alignment, race, party identification, and ideology are distinct
characteristics of voters and of constituencies. Though it should be acknowledged that African
Americans form a very strong Democratic constituency, no racial or ethnic group identifies or votes
universally in support of one party or the other. Racial and ethnic divisions along party lines do
not necessarily reflect broader ideological divisions between groups either. Solidly partisan racial
and ethnic groups do not hold ideological views in line with their preferred party’s stances across
3North Carolina v. Covington. 2016. 1:15-CV-399 (M.D. North Carolina).; Perez v. Abbott. 2017. SA-11-CV-360
(W.D. Texas).
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all issues (Gay, 2014). Americans’ views on racial and racialized issues tend to reflect their own
racial or ethnic identities (Tesler, 2012; Gilens, 1999; Griffin and Newman, 2008), but no significant
differences in public opinion emerge between members of various racial and ethnic groups on
nonracial issues (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001). Nonetheless, the assumptions that
politicians make about the relationship between a person’s race or ethnicity and her partisanship or
ideology influence how they campaign and represent constituencies.
Substantively, studying the implications of racial and ethnic diversity for representation is
important in its own right given its implications for party coalition building in future elections.
Demographers have projected that, if current patterns of immigration and birth rates persist, the
United States will become a majority-minority country in the middle of the 21st Century (Frey,
2014). In response to these predictions, some Republican strategists have called for the party to
soften its stances on racial issues in an effort to appeal to nonwhite voters going forward. Democratic
strategists have doubled down on efforts to portray their opponents as racists out of touch with the
needs of nonwhite Americans.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on race and representation by examining how
candidates and officeholders act when competing for the votes of members of multiple racial and
ethnic groups. While political scientists have developed an extensive literature on the representation of
racial and ethnic minority groups, the research has tended to focus on the incentives for officeholders
or governments to advance the interests of a given minority group (e.g. Griffin and Newman,
2008; Casellas, 2010; Gay, 2002; Grose, 2011; Swain, 1993; Broockman, 2013). These studies have
generally found that representatives of districts with larger minority populations have greater electoral
incentive to represent minority interests. However, officeholders may also have electoral incentives
to ignore or work against minority interests, even when minority populations are relatively large, if a
majority group of voters opposes minority political goals (Canon, 1999). Scholars have also studied
the implications of racial diversity for policy outcomes, generally finding that government policy
is less redistributive in more racially diverse states and cities (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Trounstine,
2016; Fellowes and Rowe, 2004; Soss, Fording, and Schram, 2008). Studying the representation of
racially diverse populations can help scholars understand the political incentives and disincentives
for officeholders to create and implement redistributive policies.
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Overview
In what follows, I provide evidence for these claims in three empirical chapters. All the data I
use describes electorates, candidates, and lawmakers in the 50 American states. The states serve as
an ideal context for study. States are meaningful political units that elect representatives to the federal
government but which also elect their own executives, legislatures, and sometimes judiciaries. All
states have party organizations aligned with national Democratic and Republican party organizations
that coordinate campaigns and involve themselves in politics.4 At the same time, the states vary in
the racial and ideological diversity of their citizenries. They also vary in the partisanship exhibited
by elected officials. Some state parties are as polarized as the national parties; other state parties hold
fairly similar stances on the issues. Finally, the states offer the right-sized context to examine several
variables of interest using quantitative data. They contain large enough populations that data from
national public opinion polls can be broken down into accurate state-level samples (Norrander, 2001;
Carsey and Harden, 2010). They also offer 50 observations of legislative bodies, 7,283 observations
of state legislators, and about 10,000 observations of state legislative candidates—much greater
variation than can be found in the study of Congress.
Chapter 2 explains why some electorates are more ideologically diverse than others. Previous
studies have explained legislative behavior as a result of the ideological diversity of constituencies, but
have not yet offered a theory of what factors produce more ideologically diverse districts. The closest
explanation provided is that more demographically diverse populations are more ideologically diverse
(Fiorina, 1974; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006), a notion challenged by more recent literature (Gerber
and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010). In contrast, Chapter 2 explains that ideological
diversity results from differences in urbanization and education levels across states. It also establishes
that more racially diverse populations are not more ideologically diverse. The results are important to
the dissertation in providing further evidence that the two concepts are theoretically and empirically
distinct.
Chapter 3 outlines a group diversity theory of candidate behavior. In districts home to a more
diverse set of social groups, candidates present themselves as partisans in order to make appeals
4Even Nebraska, which has no formal party caucuses in its Unicameral Legislature and which elects nonpartisan
candidates to office, has party organizations involved in organizing voters in elections for partisan statewide and federal
offices.
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across social groups and build a winning coalition of support. In more homogeneous districts,
candidates distance themselves from their party in order to make group-based appeals to members of
the majority social group. I bring to bear two pieces of evidence. First, I analyze the text of state
senate candidates’ campaign websites. I use the text to create a measure of candidate partisanship,
then regress partisanship on a measure of racial diversity. The results show that candidates use more
partisan rhetoric when campaigning in racially diverse districts, especially when the population of
the district is large. Second, I analyze a survey of state legislative candidates. I find that candidates
running in more racially diverse districts indicate a greater willingness to represent the views of their
party in office than the views of their constituencies.
Chapter 4 extends the group diversity theory to the behavior of the elected members of state
legislatures. Legislators use their roll-call voting record to signal partisanship to constituents.
Representatives of more diverse districts will vote more in line with party leadership in order to signal
their support of multiple groups in their party’s coalition. Representatives of less diverse districts will
vote more independently of party leadership, since their votes are more constrained by constituency
preferences and less constrained by the needs of maintaining party support. Analysis of the roll-call
voting records of more than 7,000 state legislators in 2010 indicates that representatives of more
racially diverse districts hold more partisan voting records on average. Turning to aggregate-level
data, the results indicate that state legislatures governing more racially diverse populations on the
whole exhibit greater polarization between the two major parties.
I offer a summary of the contributions and implications of this dissertation in Chapter 5. The
results suggest that lawmakers and candidates have incentives in racially diverse and ideologically
diverse districts to position themselves as extreme partisans. They also imply that party polarization
will continue to increase as the nation grows more racially diverse in coming decades. These findings
suggest that American political institutions fall short in ensuring equality in representation and
incentiving compromise between factions with conflicting interests.
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT EXPLAINS IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN THE STATES?
Why are some state populations ideologically diverse while other state populations are ideo-
logically homogeneous? Scholars have argued that greater demographic diversity predicts greater
ideological diversity,5 assuming that differences in issue-specific opinions or in partisan leanings
between social and economic groups aggregate to a wider distribution of ideological views in an
electorate (Fiorina, 1974; Bond, 1983; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006). However, some of the most
demographically diverse locations in the country—large cities—also tend to be the most ideologically
homogeneous (and liberal). Likewise, scholars measuring ideological diversity in the states have
found that some of the most demographically homogeneous states, such as Oregon, Montana, and
Iowa, are among the most ideologically diverse (Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Kirkland, 2014).
Departing from previous work, this chapter makes the case that differences in the urbanization
and education levels of state populations explain the variation in ideological diversity. Political
views and affinities tend to be homogeneous within localized areas, but ideological orientations
vary across communities (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003). When populations are more dispersed
across communities with diverging political orientations, ideological diversity increases. Generally
speaking, the principal political divide across communities in recent years has been between rural
and urban areas, with rural Americans voting strongly Republican and urban Americans voting
strongly Democratic. By extension, state populations that are more divided between rural and urban
communities are more likely to hold more diverse political views.
At the same time, most Americans are inattentive to politics and lack a coherent ideology
structuring their opinions across issues. Highly educated individuals are most likely to hold ideo-
logically structured issue preferences (Converse, 1964; Federico and Schneider, 2007; Zaller, 1992;
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Holding multiple issue preferences consistent with an ideology
moves individuals to the extremes of the distribution of citizen ideology on a liberal-conservative
5Researchers also refer to this concept as ideological heterogeneity or ideological variance. For the sake of ease and
consistency, I use the term ideological diversity throughout.
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dimension (Broockman, 2016). When more individuals are positioned at the extremes and fewer
are positioned at the median, populations are more ideologically diverse. In the aggregate, higher
education levels should increase ideological diversity by pushing already liberal people further to the
left and pushing already conservative people further to the right.
Analysis of data from the 2012 American National Election Study, multiple waves of the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and the American Community Survey sponsored by
the U.S. Census Bureau provide support for these predictions. Results using individual-level data
demonstrate that more educated individuals are more likely to hold ideologically extreme views
across issues. Further analyses using aggregate-level data show that states with a mix of rural and
urban populations and states with larger populations of college graduates are more ideologically
diverse.
This chapter develops and contributes a theoretical explanation of why some populations are
more ideologically diverse than others. It also provides evidence that demographic diversity and
ideological diversity are empirically unrelated. The findings have implications for our understanding
of party polarization, both in the mass public and among elected officials.
Citizen Preferences and Ideological Diversity in the U.S.
Central to democratic representation is the expectation that elected officials learn and act on
the policy preferences of voters. In order to assess whether American officeholders live up to those
expectations, it is necessary to measure the political opinions of voters and compare them with the
actions and public positions of officeholders. Building on spatial models of representation (Downs,
1957), scholars have attempted to measure opinions by measuring citizen ideology on a single,
left-right dimension (e.g. Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985; Berry et al., 1998; Park, Gelman, and
Bafumi, 2004; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). Efforts to summarize citizens’ views on a wide
range of issues into a summary measure of ideology have been important for comparing citizen views
on a common scale across subnational regions.
Classic studies of representation often derive a mean ideology among citizens in an electorate
and assess responsiveness by measuring the correlation between citizen ideology and a measure of
the position taken by the corresponding representative (e.g. Miller and Stokes, 1963; Ansolabehere,
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Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Clinton, 2006; Powell, 1982; Wright and Berkman, 1986; Erikson, Wright,
and McIver, 1993). However, calculating the mean of citizen ideology alone obscures important
information about the variation in citizen views within an area. Variance in opinion is also important
to representation. Officeholders must make political decisions while taking into account competing
political demands made on them by constituents who disagree with one another.
Ideological diversity (i.e. variance in citizen opinion) in constituencies changes lawmakers’
electoral incentives compared to ideologically homogeneous districts and induces different types
of behavior in office (Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006; Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Jones, 2003;
Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Ensley, 2012; Kirkland, 2014; Gronke, 2000)6.
Lawmakers in diverse districts tend to respond less to average constituency preferences (Bishin, Dow,
and Adams, 2006; Gerber and Lewis, 2004), side with their party’s leadership more often when
casting roll-call votes (Harden and Carsey, 2012), and position themselves to mobilize supporters
rather than persuade swing voters (Ensley, 2012). Legislatures governing more ideologically diverse
states also tend to be more polarized (Kirkland, 2014). Understanding why some electorates are
more ideologically diverse than others can move scholars toward understanding the electoral causes
of polarization among representatives in government.
Demographic Explanations of Ideological Diversity
Ideological diversity has been taken as a set feature of a political environment rather than a
political phenomenon deserving attention and explanation in its own right. Prior work tends to
assume that demographic diversity produces greater ideological diversity (Fiorina, 1974; Bond, 1983;
Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006). Even scholars skeptical of the assumption that ideological diversity
can be correctly measured using demographic variables seem to accept a theoretical explanation of
ideological diversity using demographic diversity. For example, Levendusky and Pope conclude that
“...individual demographics are related to ideological heterogeneity, but we are probably not justified
in using them as a simple proxy for attitudinal heterogeneity [emphasis in the original]” (2010, 274).
6Work on constituency heterogeneity (Fiorina, 1974; Bullock and Brady, 1983; Bond, 1983; Bailey and Brady, 1998;
Kuklinski and Elling, 1977; Shapiro et al., 1990) provided the theoretical grounding for these studies and also showed that
representatives of diverse districts behave differently than representatives of homogeneous districts.
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At a cursory glance, the demographic explanation makes sense. Demographic groups of voters
tend to form issue publics that share intense preferences on issues directly relevant to their group
(Converse, 1964; Henderson, 2014; Claassen and Nicholson, 2013). An extension of the logic is
that when a greater variety of groups is present in a region, a greater variety of political ideas and
orientations is also present.
However, there are reasons to doubt that demographics provide an adequate explanation for
ideological diversity, at least as it has traditionally been defined and operationalized by scholars.
Broadly speaking, ideological diversity could refer to a mix of preferences, values, or priorities on
any number of issues or issue dimensions. However, scholars have almost exclusively defined or
operationalized ideological diversity as variance on a single liberal-conservative dimension (Gerber
and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Kirkland, 2014). The
liberal-conservative dimension has been important to focus on, since variance on this dimension in
electorates has implications for the extremity and polarization of elected officials.
Crucially, the definition of ideology undergirding this conceptualization of ideological diversity
requires that citizens hold a consistent set of beliefs across a wide range of issues (Converse, 1964;
Broockman, 2016). However, there is little reason to suspect that issue publics hold different views
than the general public on issues that are not directly relevant or salient to the issue public. For
example, teachers who strongly favor increased funding for public education are unlikely to hold
uniform opinions on whether or not the federal government should create a path to citizenship for
undocumented immigrants living in the United States.
It is possible for members of issue publics to hold views sympathetic to a position advocated
by a separate issue public. However, groups with common issue positions tend to form part of
the same party coalition. Parties adopt platforms appealing to coalitions of social groups with the
purpose of building electoral majorities (Bawn et al., 2012; Karol, 2009). Through a process of
conflict extension (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Layman et al., 2010), attentive partisans come to adopt
issue opinions in line with the party platform, including on issues in which they have little personal
stake. In other words, shared positions between issue publics tend to occur because of their shared
partisanship, not because issue publics hold common interests in the absence of partisanship.
Because of the centrality of partisanship in shaping ideology, we can expect demographic
diversity to predict ideological diversity only if demographic cleavages map cleanly onto partisan
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cleavages (Koetzle, 1998). Demographic cleavages clearly demarcate party lines in certain contexts.
For example, in many Southern states, predominantly white communities tend to vote Republican
while predominantly black communities tend to vote Democratic, such that a person’s race will
very accurately predict his or her party preference. However in other parts of the country, group
boundaries do not form clear partisan boundaries. To continue with the example of race, white voters
in many other states are split in their support of the two parties, making race an imperfect predictor of
party support. Despite the fact that voters have increasingly split along racial lines in party preference
over the last two decades (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Hajnal and Lee,
2011), racial cleavages and partisan cleavages still do not neatly overlap.
Evidence contradicting the demographic diversity hypothesis is readily available from an ex-
amination of urban populations. Cities tend to host more demographically diverse populations than
suburban and rural areas in the U.S. both on economic and on racial and ethnic dimensions (Gimpel
and Schuknecht, 2003). However, cities have also become Democratic strongholds in elections
in the last few decades (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2002; Pearson-Merkowitz and McTague, 2008).
Regardless of the mechanism, individuals loyal to one party are most likely to hold views that are
internally consistent and that diverge from the views of loyalists in the other party. In order to
understand ideological diversity in the electorate, we must move beyond the demographic diversity
explanation.
Explaining Ideological Diversity
Scholars have frequently operationalized ideology in the American public by assuming a single
liberal-conservative dimension, an assumption informing numerous measures of citizen ideology (e.g.
Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1985; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi, 2004; Berry et al., 1998; Brace et al.,
2002; Carsey and Harden, 2010).7 Likewise, scholars studying ideological diversity have usually
operationalized the concept as the variance in left-right ideology (Levendusky and Pope, 2010;
7Others challenge the unidimensional conception of ideology both within individuals and populations. Layman and
Carsey (2002) demonstrate that individual issue preferences tend to be multidimensional, though party identifiers have
developed more unidimensional issue preferences over time. Ensley, Tofias, and de Marchi (2009) provide evidence that
when social and economic dimensions of public opinion in a constituency are unaligned with a single ideology (e.g. a
district liberal on social issues but conservative on economic issues), incumbents hold a greater electoral advantage.
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Figure 2.1: Ideological Diversity in Two Hypothetical States
State A State B
Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Kirkland, 2014; Ensley, 2012).8 In line with this
unidimensional assumption about ideology, populations are thought to be more ideologically diverse
when voters are more spread out along the liberal to conservative spectrum. Diverse districts require
the presence of some liberal voters, some moderate voters, and some conservative voters. Ideological
perspectives that do not fall along this spectrum—for example, anarchism—are not incorporated.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the distribution of left-right ideology among citizens in two hypothetical
states, with the horizontal axis representing ideology on a liberal-conservative spectrum and the
vertical axis representing the density of voters. In State A, citizen ideology is more homogeneous.
Most voters are moderate and clustered tightly around the median ideological position. In State B,
citizen ideology is more diverse. State B contains a mixture of liberal, moderate, and conservative
voters. By this unidimensional conception of citizen ideology, states become more ideologically
diverse as the variance of left-right ideology increases. In other words, state populations are more
ideologically diverse when more citizens hold very liberal or very conservative ideological opinions.
The key to understanding ideological diversity is understanding how some citizens come to hold
extreme positions on a left-right ideological spectrum.
8Levendusky and Pope (2010) introduce a measure that can be adapted to fit any ideological dimension of interest by
researchers. However, they demonstrate and validate a measure that captures a left-right dimension of ideology.
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Figure 2.2: Micro Foundations of Ideological Diversity
Given this understanding, differences in ideological diversity across states are best explained as
the product of urbanization and education levels in the population. Figure 2.2 graphically presents an
individual-level process that, in the aggregate, may produce greater ideological diversity. Individuals
begin life socialized in a context that predisposes them to supporting either Republicans or Democrats.
As individuals become more knowledgeable about politics, as they might through formal education,
they align their views on specific issues to be consistent with the political preferences of their
socializing community. As more individuals come to adopt consistently conservative views while
others in the region come to adopt consistently liberal views, ideological diversity increases.
The process laid out in Figure 2.2 should be read as a process that produces ideological diversity
given certain parameters of the context and education variables. First, ideological diversity rests
on a mix of social contexts producing individuals predisposed to supporting both parties in fairly
even numbers. If the social contexts present in a state produce only Democratic citizens but very
few Republicans (or vice versa), this process would predict average citizen ideology to be more
extreme as education levels increase, but not more diverse. Second, the extent to which a population
is ideologically diverse among people identifying with one party depends on there being a mix of
education levels. Taken to the hypothetical extreme, if all individuals identifying with one party were
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very well-educated, the model would predict that group to be ideologically homogeneous. In simple
terms, the model predicts that ideological diversity results from (a) social contexts producing both
liberals and conservatives in a population and (b) from education pushing some (but not all) people
from each type of context toward the ideological extremes.
Social Context and Ideology
I assume that a predisposition toward either a liberal or conservative ideology comes from
individuals’ social contexts early in life. Individuals are born and socialized in family and community
environments that fundamentally shape their political outlook (Campbell et al., 1960; Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). Factors such as individual social identities (which are often translated
through family or community ties) and the political leanings of their neighborhoods strongly influence
a person’s propensity to prefer Republican or Democratic policies and candidates (Huckfeldt et al.,
1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Achen and Bartels,
2016). Once in place, a political outlook or partisan identification is unlikely to change over the
course of an individual’s life (Jennings and Markus, 1984).
The contexts in which citizens are socialized tend to be politically homogeneous (Huckfeldt et al.,
1995; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003). Homogeneity arises
in part from humans’ natural tendency to seek out and form relationships with other people like them
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Homogeneity may also arise from norms of minimizing
political disagreement in social talk (Huckfeldt and Mendez, 2008) and human tendencies to find
common ground and emphasize shared identity in informal discussion (Cramer Walsh, 2003).
An important caveat to note is that social context is not deterministic. Not all individuals adopt
the political or social identities of their parents or their communities (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers,
2009) and political disagreement persists within political communication networks (Huckfeldt,
Johnson, and Sprague, 2004). However, because homophily is a driving characteristic of human
interaction, individuals tend to sort themselves into contexts where their views are reinforced (Bishop,
2008; Myers, 2013).
While social pressure tends to homogenize views within local contexts, political differences
across different types of communities create greater ideological diversity. Communities form
divergent political loyalties to the parties, likely based on local demographic and economic differences
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(Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003). When more similar types of communities exist within a population,
more citizens across the population as a whole share common political views. Individual-level
demographic and economic characteristics certainly play a role in predicting party support and
ultimately ideology. However, geographic space also plays a role in driving individual political
loyalties (Myers, 2013; Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003) because people are more disposed to forming
social networks and fitting in to the social context in which they live.
Under this explanation, the relationship between social context and ideological diversity depends
on different types of communities existing within a state population. Cities in the U.S. tend to be home
to more homogeneously liberal populations; rural places tend to be home to more homogeneously
conservative populations (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003; Pearson-Merkowitz and McTague, 2008).
By extension, states with entirely urban or entirely rural populations would be most likely to have
ideologically homogeneous populations. No state has an entirely urban or rural population. However,
the states do vary substantially in the proportion of residents living in each type of environment.
Populations at large should be most ideologically diverse when a mix of rural and urban communities
exist within a state’s population. Formally, I test the hypothesis:
H1: Ideological diversity forms an inverse-U relationship with urbanization, such that ideological
diversity is lowest in mostly urban and mostly rural states.
Education and Ideological Extremity
The context of an individual’s socialization plants the seed for whether a person is predisposed
toward adopting a particular ideological outlook. However, a predisposition from social context
does not automatically translate into a coherent political ideology. Most voters are inattentive to
politics and hold neither strong nor ideological views on most political issues (Campbell et al., 1960;
Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
Ideology forms as individuals gather more information about politics and align that information
with their preexisting beliefs. Humans are motivated reasoners (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge,
2006); citizens tend to take cues on issue stances from political elites they already support (Petersen
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et al., 2013; Lenz, 2013). If their views conflict, individuals change their views to match those elite
sources (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Achen and Bartels, 2016).9
A necessary step in forming a coherent ideology is acquiring information about politics. While
family ties and socialization predispose people to supporting one party’s agenda or the other (Camp-
bell et al., 1960), building an ideology requires familiarity with issues, politicians, and political events.
Generally, more politically knowledgeable citizens hold more consistent or structured ideological
views (Broockman, 2016; Zaller, 1992; Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009; Federico and Schneider,
2007).
One way many people acquire information about politics in the early years of their lives is
through education. As students move through years of schooling, they encounter formal and informal
opportunities to gain information about politics. Formally, students take courses such as American
history and civics, which in many states are required curriculum for graduation. In institutions
of higher education, students are able to complete a broader variety of courses related to politics.
Informally, students in secondary and higher education programs are exposed to social networks
comprised of teachers and peers who hold and impart information about politics through casual
discussion. Even after graduation, the social networks and learning habits that individuals acquire
through formal education continue to shape their political thinking.
People who have completed more years of schooling also tend to know more about politics, all
else equal (Zaller, 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Fiske, Lau, and Smith, 1990). In his classic
essay on belief systems in mass publics, Converse (1964) expected that gaining more information
about politics, perhaps through higher education, helped citizens to form consistent ideological
viewpoints. Converse wrote that “...as one moves from elite sources of belief systems downwards
on such an information scale...the contextual grasp of ‘standard’ political belief systems fades out
very rapidly, almost before one has passed beyond the 10% of the American population that in the
1950s had completed standard college training” (1964, 213). Subsequent research has also found
9Carsey and Layman (2006) and Achen and Bartels (2016) both note that people who have a prior intense preference
on a given issue (i.e. members of issue publics) are more likely to change their party identification to match their issue
preference than vice versa. In contrast, people who align their issue preferences to fit their party’s position generally do
not find those issue to be particularly salient or important. I assume that most issues are not salient to most people, and
that most ideological alignment comes from individuals changing their views on non-salient issues to align with their
pre-existing partiality to one of the parties.
19
that holding a college degree correlates with holding a more ideologically structured set of political
beliefs (Federico and Schneider, 2007; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991).
Formal education is not the only way for citizens to become knowledgeable about politics. Many
people with little formal education know a lot about politics; many people with terminal degrees
know next to nothing. Paying close attention to news coverage or becoming personally involved in
politics can also increase political knowledge, regardless of educational background (Barabas and
Jerit, 2009; Althaus, 2003).
However, education constitutes the single strongest predictor of political knowledge among
individuals (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). More education also positively predicts greater
knowledge of recent political news, not simply static information like the length of presidential term
limits, and greater policy-specific knowledge (Barabas et al., 2014). While many people who are
already knowledgeable about or interested in politics likely select into completing higher degrees
of education, it is also likely that many people who never would have sought to obtain political
knowledge on their own nonetheless gain that knowledge through formal education.
Higher education levels in the population translate to more individuals developing more ideo-
logically structured issue opinions. People predisposed from their social context to holding liberal
views align their views with a liberal ideology; conservatives do the same. At the individual level,
education moves people to the extremes. However, not all highly educated people automatically
become ideologues. Individuals raised in politically moderate communities, or individuals with
cross-cutting political identities, may maintain consistently moderate views as they obtain more
formal education.
Higher aggregate education levels are necessary but not sufficient for increasing ideological
diversity. In a hypothetical state where all voters were uneducated, we would expect to observe very
little ideological diversity. In a different hypothetical state where all voters live in moderate-leaning
communities, increases in education levels would likely not produce greater ideological diversity.
However, conditional on a mix of voters predisposed toward liberal, conservative, or moderate views
being present in a state, higher education levels should further increase the variance in ideology. I
hypothesize that:
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H2: As education levels in a population increase, the ideological diversity of the population increases.
To summarize, social context predisposes some individuals to holding liberal views and others
to holding conservative views. The people best able to construct their predisposition into coherent
ideologies are those who know more about politics. The people who know the most about politics
tend to be people who have completed more years of schooling. In the aggregate, conditional upon a
politically heterogeneous mix of social contexts being present in a state, greater aggregate education
levels translate into a population with more structured and extreme ideological positions. When
more citizens in a population hold extreme liberal or extreme conservative ideological positions,
populations are more ideologically diverse.
Individual Predictors of Ideological Extremity
Before testing the hypotheses using aggregate, state-level data, I provide evidence supporting
the individual-level assumption that more educated individuals hold more extreme ideological
positions. I conduct this analysis for two reasons. First, if it is the case that higher aggregate
education levels are associated with greater ideological diversity because more voters hold very
liberal or very conservative views, then it must be established that education levels are associated
with ideological extremity at the individual level. Conducting this analysis will help to reassure
readers that aggregate-level findings do not suffer from the problems associated with ecological
inference. Second, education levels in the population can be measured many different ways, such
as with high school graduation rates or the percent of residents holding four-year college degrees.
Individual-level analysis will help to establish whether ideological extremity increases with education
levels in a linear fashion, or whether extremity occurs once some threshold of educational obtainment
(e.g. a college education) has been reached.
I turn to two separate data sets for evidence. I use the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES), which also serves as the source of data for the aggregate-level analyses in the next
section. Using this data set brings the advantage of a large sample size that allows for reliable
estimation of the substantive relationship between education and ideological extremity. I also
replicate the individual-level analysis using data from the 2012 American National Election Study
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(ANES). If analysis of both data sets produces similar results, readers can be more confident in the
generalizability of the results.
To measure individual ideological extremity, I factor analyzed individual responses to a battery
of questions on six political issues. The issues were chosen to align with the issues chosen by Harden
and Carsey (2012) in their analysis of ideological diversity using CCES data. Both the CCES and
ANES asked respondents questions about their positions of four of the six issues: affirmative action,
environmental protection, abortion, and healthcare reform. The fifth question used in the CCES, on
stem cell research, was not asked on the ANES. Instead, I substituted respondents’ opinion on the
issue of legalizing child adoption by gay couples. I assume that respondent opinions are positively
correlated on the two issues, given that disagreements on both issues are rooted in differences in
religious values. The complete wording for all six questions on both surveys is provided in Table
A.1 of Appendix A. This measure also forms the base of my measure of aggregate-level measure of
ideological diversity in the following section.
For the present analysis, I calculated a factor score for each individual based on the first
dimension principal component, which I assume captures the individual’s placement on a single
liberal/conservative ideological dimension. This created a measure of ideology with a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one, such that higher scores indicate a more liberal ideology and lower
scores indicate a more conservative ideology. I created the dependent variable Ideological Extremity
by calculating the absolute value of each individual’s ideology factor score. Larger values indicate
more extreme ideological positions, while values closer to zero indicate less extreme ideological
positions.10
The independent variable of interest is respondents’ level of education. For both surveys, I
measure Education by relying on respondents’ self-reports of their highest completed level of
education. I use an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 4: 0 indicates the respondent has less than a high
school education; 1 indicates the respondent holds a high school diploma; 2 indicates the respondent
attended college but does not hold a four-year degree; 3 indicates the respondent graduated college
10Broockman (2016) asserts that ideological extremity as measured using latent analysis techniques tends to capture
ideological consistency rather than extremity. I add evidence support of the argument that extreme liberals and extreme
conservatives take more issue positions consistent with one ideology or the other. However, I show in Appendix A that
ideological consistency and extremity should nonetheless be treated as distinct concepts, since extremity differentiates
consistent liberals and conservatives from consistent moderates. Moreover, I provide evidence that higher education levels
are not related to greater consistency among moderate voters.
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with a four-year degree; and 4 indicates the respondent holds a graduate or professional degree.
Because of the emphasis on a college education as the crucial level of education necessary to hold
a structured ideology in previous research (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Fiske, Lau, and
Smith, 1990; Converse, 1964), I use as an alternative measure a simple indicator variable of College
education, describing whether or not the respondent holds a four-year Bachelor’s degree.
As a preliminary test of the model, I examine the bivariate relationship between level of education
and ideological extremity using both CCES and ANES data. Figure 2.3 plots the relationship. The
horizontal axes indicate the level of education completed by the respondent. The vertical axes shows
the value of my ideological extremity measure, with larger values indicating more ideologically
extreme positions. For both sets of data, the plots show that for every increase in level of education,
the average ideological extremity of respondents increases.
I run a series of regression models to confirm the positive association between ideological
extremity and education found in Figure 2.3 while controlling for potential confounding factors.
Education levels are not randomly assigned throughout the population. Individuals who select into
completing higher levels of education may also possess greater interest in or more knowledge about
politics. First, I control for respondents’ Interest in politics. Both surveys ask respondents how often
they pay attention to news about government and politics. Responses for this variable are coded so
that higher values represent more interest in politics. Second I control for respondents’ Knowledge
about politics. Unfortunately, the CCES does not ask respondents factual questions about politics, so
I rely exclusively on the ANES for this control variable. I measure political knowledge using five
questions: how many terms a President is constitutionally allowed to serve in office, the length of
U.S. Senators’ terms, the size of the budget deficit, what Medicare is, and how much the federal
government spends on foreign aid. I factor analyzed responses to the questions and calculated a
factor score such that higher values represent more knowledgeable individuals.
I include a number of control variables for individual demographic factors that might influence
one’s ideological extremity. Given evidence that gender affects how respondents answer survey
questions about politics (Barabas et al., 2014), I include an indicator variable for whether or not
the respondent is Male. Under the assumption that older individuals might possess greater personal
experience in and knowledge about the political process, I also control for the Age of the respondent.
Finally, I assume that partisans have more extreme ideological positions than pure independents.
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Figure 2.3: Ideological Extremity by Level of Education
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I include indicators for both Democratic and Republican respondents, which are coded to include
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respondents who identify as partisans and independent respondents who report leaning towards one
party or the other.
I analyze the relationship between ideological extremity and political knowledge using ordinary
least squares regression. Table A.2 in Appendix A presents summary statistics for each of these
variables. Specifically I test the model:
Ideological Extremity = β0 + β1 · Education + Controls + 
I expect a positive, statistically significant coefficient estimate for the measure of education.
The results of a full model including control variables are presented Table 2.1. Models 1 through
4 display results using CCES data, while models 5 through 8 display results from ANES data. All
eight models provide evidence that more educated individuals hold more extreme ideological views
on average across issues. In both data sets, higher levels of education are positively related to
ideological extremity. This finding holds whether education is measured with an ordinal variable
capturing level of education or an indicator variable for whether the respondent holds a four-year
college degree. In fact, the sizes of the coefficient estimates for both variables are very similar across
data sets. An increase of one level of education is associated with a 0.04-unit increase in ideological
extremity in the CCES data and a 0.03-unit increase in the ANES data. On the college education
indicator variable, moving from less than a college education to a college education is associated
with a roughly 0.07-unit increase in ideological extremity. The substantive importance of this change
is rather small; the standard deviation of the ideological extremity variable is 0.48 for the CCES data
and 0.57 for the ANES data. However, the coefficients estimates in all eight models are statisticially
significant at the 0.05 level of confidence.
The findings remain consistent even after controlling for individual characteristics, such as
political interest and political knowledge, that may confound the relationship between education and
ideological extremity. Generally speaking, results for the control variables align with expectations.
Results from both surveys indicate that respondents more interested in politics hold issue positions
that are significantly more extreme, while results from the ANES show that more politically knowl-
edgeable respondents also hold more ideologically extreme beliefs. While the CCES and ANES
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Table 2.1: Education and Ideological Extremity
CCES 2010 ANES 2012
Dependent variable: Ideological Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
College 0.07∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.07∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Interest 0.13∗ 0.11∗ 0.13∗ 0.11∗ 0.11∗ 0.10∗ 0.11∗ 0.10∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Knowledge 0.07∗ 0.06∗ 0.07∗ 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Male 0.03∗ 0.03∗ -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Democrat 0.15∗ 0.16∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.34∗ 0.23∗ 0.40∗ 0.28∗ 0.49∗ 0.38∗ 0.53∗ 0.42∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 53,728 53,728 53,728 53,728 4645 4645 4645 4645
Adj. R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Data for models 1 through
4 come from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Data for models 5 through 8 come from the 2012
American National Election Study.
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results provide mixed evidence of gender effects in the responses, data from both surveys show that
older individuals, as well as partisans, hold more ideologically extreme issue positions.
These results do not rule out the possibility that the relationship between education and ideo-
logical extremity is contingent on some threshold. For instance, it could be the case that college
education is responsible for helping respondents structure political beliefs, while people with less
than a college education hold less ideologically structured beliefs. To address this question, I estimate
several models similar to those in Table 2.1 that collapse the education variable to a series of four
indicators for each level of education (high school diploma or greater, some college or greater, college
or greater, graduate or professional degree). The results, presented in Table A.3 of Appendix A,
generally show that the coefficient size for each indicator variable increases as the level of education
increases. These findings are consistent with the idea that ideological extremity increases at each
change in education level and inconsistent with the idea that a college education (or any other single
education level) serves as a minimum threshold after which respondents begin to hold structured
political beliefs. The results also accord with the bivariate results presented in Figure 2.3.
Overall, these results confirm a positive relationship between higher education levels and
ideological extremity. They also demonstrate that evidence at the individual level is consistent with
an aggregate-level theory of political behavior described above. I move forward to analyzing the
relationship at the aggregate level.
Ideological Diversity in the 50 States
A larger empirical challenge is establishing that more educated populations tend on average to
contain more citizens with extreme ideological positions, and that this greater ideological extremity
produces greater ideological diversity in states with a mix of urban and rural populations. In order
to observe variation in ideological diversity across subnational populations, I turn to a comparison
of the fifty U.S. states. The states provide appropriate units of analysis for three principal reasons.
First, states are meaningful political units that are represented in the U.S. Senate and that elect
their own governments. Because more ideologically diverse populations tend to elect more extreme
candidates (Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Ensley, 2012; Harden and Carsey, 2012) and more polarized
legislatures (Kirkland, 2014), comparing the sources of ideological diversity in states helps us
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better understand the process by which disagreement in electorates translates into polarization in
government institutions. Second, state borders are stationary. This fact is important because states
are among the few subnational units of analysis that are defined without regard to the ideological
diversity of the population (in contrast with legislative districts, which are frequently drawn with the
specific purpose of reducing ideological diversity). Third, state populations are sufficiently large to
allow for the measurement of variance in citizen ideology using responses to large-N national surveys
(e.g Norrander, 2001; Carsey and Harden, 2010) without having to rely on proxy variables (e.g. Berry
et al., 1998) or complicated estimation strategies like multilevel regression and poststratification (e.g.
Lax and Phillips, 2009).
I follow procedures established by Harden and Carsey (2012) to measure the dependent variable,
Ideological Diversity. I produce a measure of ideology for each individual by factor analyzing
responses to five different issue opinion questions put to respondents on the 2010 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES). This measure uses the same set of questions and technique as
the individual-level analysis above. Then, I calculate the mean and variance of citizen ideology by
state. I use the variance in citizen ideology as the dependent variable. Data are observed in every state
for even years from 2006 to 2014. The mean value of the variable is 0.98 with a standard deviation
of 0.09. It ranges in value from 0.715 (Rhode Island, 2008) to 1.263 (Oregon, 2008). Encouragingly,
the biennial estimates within states are fairly stable over time. The average standard deviation
for within-state estimates over time is 0.05. Table A.4 in Appendix A provides full estimates of
ideological diversity for every state-year observed in the data, as well as estimates of within-state
variance.
To test the first hypothesis, I require a measure of the urbanization of the population. The U.S.
Census Bureau provides estimates of the proportion of citizens living in urban places by state. A
place is considered Urban if it is either an “urbanized area” with more than 50,000 people or an
“urban cluster” with between 2,500 and 50,000 people. Given these thresholds, this measure is
somewhat flawed for my purposes. Under this definition, an area is considered urban even if it is a
very small town in a mostly rural area. However, political cleavages by community type are more
common between large, densely populated cities and small towns.
Moreover, this measure likely has uneven impacts across regions with differing residential
patterns. For instance, it likely that the measure underestimates urbanization for densely populated
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Northeastern states where small towns and rural areas fall in close proximity to large cities. It also
likely overestimates urbanization for Western states where, due to the terrain, relatively few people
live outside of incorporated areas but those incorporated areas include wide swaths of area. However,
any single population threshold for an area to count as urban is likely arbitrary at some level.11 In
any case, I expect that state populations with large proportions of citizens living in towns of at least
2,500 people should be strongly correlated with state populations with large proportions of citizens
living in large cities. Data for the urban population variable come from the 2010 U.S. Census.
As an initial test of the first hypothesis, I observe the bivariate relationship between urbanization
and ideological diversity. The first hypothesis holds that there should be an inverse-U relationship
between urbanization and ideological diversity. If the hypothesis is correct, we should expect a
positive relationship between urbanization and ideological diversity at low values of urbanization,
gradually curving into a negative relationship as urbanization increases.
Figure 2.4 plots the relationship between urbanization and ideological diversity using data
from 2014. The horizontal axis presents the percent urban among the state population, while the
vertical axis presents values of ideological diversity. The data best fit a curvilinear pattern. As the
proportion of urban residents in a state increases from 40% to 60%, ideological diversity increases
somewhat. However, once about 80% of the state population lives in an urban area, ideological
diversity decreases sharply. These results suggest that mostly rural and mostly urban populations tend
to be ideologically homogeneous, with states having a mix of rural and urban populations tending to
be more ideologically diverse. These data provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis.
The second hypothesis holds that more educated populations are more ideologically diverse. To
measure education, I use observational data on education levels for each state-year from the American
Community Survey produced by the U.S. Census Bureau. Using data for this variable from a separate
source than the dependent variable provides more reassurance of the generalizability of the finding
outside the context of the survey data. Specifically, my independent variable College is measured as
the percentage of the state population holding a four-year college degree in the year of observation.
States vary widely in the education levels of their citizens. According to 2014 estimates from the
11Across various federal government agencies, more than 15 definitions of which communities count as rural and which
count as urban exist. See Fahrenthold, David A. 2013. “What does rural mean? Uncle Sam has more than a dozen answers.”
Washington Post, June 8. Accessed April 22, 2017 at http://wapo.st/18h5TPX
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Figure 2.4: Urbanization and Ideological Diversity in the States
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American Community Survey, the percentage of residents holding a four-year college degree by state
varied from 18.75% in West Virginia to 39.98% in Massachusetts.
Figure 2.5 presents the bivariate relationship between education levels and ideological diversity
in the states for the year 2014. The horizontal axis presents the percent of the state’s population
that holds a four-year college degree, while the vertical axis presents the measure of ideological
diversity. The data here also fit a curvilinear pattern, in contrast with the second hypothesis that
expects a linear relationship. Moving from the minimum to median value of percent college
educated, ideological diversity increases as education levels increase. Moving from the median to
maximum value of percent college educated, though, ideological diversity decreases as education
levels increase. However, this curvilinear relationship may be confounded by the positive correlation
between education levels and urbanization. In the current data set, the Pearson’s correlation between
the two independent variables is r = 0.45. Notably, the states with high education levels and low
ideological diversity in this figure (e.g. New Jersey, Connecticut) are also largely urban states.
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Figure 2.5: College Education and Ideological Diversity in the States
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To test the two hypotheses simultaneously, and to account for possible confounding factors
excluded from the bivariate models, I estimate six multiple regression models in Table 2.2 below. In
line with prior explanations of ideological diversity (Bond, 1983; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006),
I control for two variables meant to capture demographic diversity. Previous analyses relied upon
the Sullivan index (Sullivan, 1973) to capture demographic diversity on six component variables:
occupation, religion, foreign born status, education, housing type, and income. However, subsequent
analyses discounted the variable for failing to demonstrate that component variables adequately
capture a latent variable of diversity (Patterson and Caldeira, 1984) and for failing to include
politically component relevant variables (Koetzle, 1998). Rather than relying on a questionable
measure of demographic diversity, I rely upon two separate measures of the diversity of state
populations on racial and economic dimensions. Given the primacy of race and class to political
cleavages in the U.S. (Hersh and Nall, 2016), diversity on these two variables would be more likely
than other demographic variables (such as gender, occupation, or housing type) to be correlated
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with ideological diversity. I measure Racial Diversity following Trounstine (2016), which uses a
Herfindahl index to measure the distribution of the state population among five racial and ethnic
groups: white, black, Latino, Asian American, and all others. I gather data from the American
Community Survey. I measure Economic Diversity using a Gini coefficient measuring income
inequality in each state. This figure is calculated from estimates of resident income in the ACS.
To eliminate the possibility of confounding urbanization with the size of a state population, I
control for the absolute size of state populations using estimates from the ACS. I further control
for party competition in states, since higher levels of party competition are associated with greater
social diversity (Aistrup, 2004; Patterson and Caldeira, 1984). I use two separate measures of party
competition. The first, Party Competition in Government, is a Ranney index measuring how closely
divided state legislative seats are between the two major parties. The second, Electoral Competition,
is a measure of the level of competition in state legislative elections originally proposed by Holbrook
and Van Dunk (1993).12 Data for both variables for the appropriate years are gathered from Klarner
(2013). Because more densely populated and better educated state populations also tend to be more
liberal on average, I also control for mean Citizen Ideology, using estimates from Carsey and Harden
(2010). Finally, to control for differing residential patterns across regions of the country described
above, I include indicator variables for states in the Northeast13 and states in the West.14 Summary
statistics describing all variables included are presented in Table A.5 in Appendix A.
The following model tests both hypotheses. Specifically I estimate the linear model:
Ideological Diversity = β0 + β1 · Urbanization + β2 · Urbanization2
+β3 · Education + Controls + 
If the first hypothesis is correct, I expect a positive coefficient estimate for the urban variable and
a negative coefficient estimate for its squared term. If the second hypothesis is correct, I expect a
positive, statistically significant coefficient estimate for the measure of education.
12Flavin (2012) demonstrates that these two measures capture distinct aspects of party competition.
13I consider the Northeast to include the 11 states located north and east of Washington D.C. These include CT, DE,
ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT.
14I consider the West to include the 13 states located west of the Rocky Mountains. These include AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI,
ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY.
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Table 2.2: Urbanization, Education and Ideological Diversity
Dependent variable:
Ideological Diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 1.61∗ 1.28 1.18 1.22 1.25
(0.62) (0.74) (0.66) (0.72) (0.75)
Urban2 -1.20∗ -1.02∗ -0.99∗ -1.04∗ -1.08∗
(0.43) (0.51) (0.45) (0.49) (0.53)
College -0.21 0.54∗ 0.57∗ 0.54∗
(0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23)
Racial Diversity 0.02 0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
Economic Diversity 0.24 -0.16
(0.54) (0.57)
Population (in millions) 0.00
(0.00)
Party Competition 0.16
in Government (0.09)
Electoral Competition -0.00
(0.00)
Citizen Ideology -0.00
(0.07)
Northeast -0.04∗ -0.08∗ -0.08∗ -0.07∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
West 0.10∗ 0.09∗ 0.09∗ 0.10∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.44∗ 0.56∗ 1.00∗ 0.49∗ 0.36∗ 0.40
(0.22) (0.27) (0.06) (0.23) (0.41) (0.42)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 245
Adj. R2 0.12 0.40 0.02 0.44 0.43 0.48
Note: ∗p<0.05. Bootstrap clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Five observations of
Nebraska are excluded in Model 6 because party competition in government cannot be measured in its nonpartisan legislature.
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the data. I include fixed effects for each
year of observation. Because observations are clustered within states over time, I present results with
bootstrap clustered standard errors (see Harden, 2011).
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Regression results are presented in Table 2.2. Model 1 regresses ideological diversity on percent
urban and its squared term, as well as fixed effects for the year of observation. In keeping with
the first hypothesis and the plot in Figure 2.4, the results indicate an inverse-U relationship with
a positive sign for the coefficient estimate for percent urban positive and a negative sign for the
squared term. At the minimum value of percent urban (0.39), ideological diversity is estimated at
0.89 (roughly a standard deviation below the mean observed value of ideological diversity). At the
mean value of percent urban (0.74), ideological diversity is estimated at 0.97 (close to the mean value
of ideological diversity). At the maximum value of percent urban (0.95), ideological diversity is
estimated at 0.89 (again about a standard deviation below the mean). The results indicate that at low
and high values of urbanization, ideological diversity is low, but ideological diversity is relatively
high at average levels of urbanization.
In Model 2, I include controls for states in the Northeast and the West, given the distinct
residential patterns of those regions. Including these terms does not change the direction of the
coefficient estimates. However, including these terms substantially improves model fit, increasing
from an adjusted R-squared value of 0.12 in Model 1 to 0.40 in Model 2. The results indicate that
Northeastern states are significantly less ideologically diverse than other states while Western states
are significantly more ideologically diverse than the others.
In Model 3, I test the bivariate relationship between college education levels and ideological
diversity. In line with Figure 2.5, the sign of the coefficient estimate is negative, but is not statistically
significant. However, the theoretical discussion above suggests that education moves individuals
to the extremes once their social context is taken into account. In Model 4, I include both the
urbanization and education variables, as well as the regional controls. The coefficient estimates for
the urbanization and regional variables are similar to the estimates presented in Model 2. However,
the coefficient estimate for the college education variable is positive and statistically significant.
Moreover, the size of the coefficient estimate indicates the association between education levels and
ideological diversity is substantively important. Controlling for other variables in the model, moving
from the maximum (0.17) to the minimum (0.40) value of the college education variable produces a
0.12-unit increase in ideological diversity—roughly a one standard deviation increase in the value of
ideological diversity. As a substantive example, such an increase in education levels would result in
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an ideologically homogeneous state like Massachusetts looking more like a state of fairly average
ideological diversity like Florida.
Model 5 presents results comparing the independent variables of interest to the two variables
capturing demographic diversity explanations of ideological diversity. While the coefficient estimates
for the urbanization, regional, and education variables remain virtually unchanged between the
fourth and fifth models in terms of size and significance, Model 5 shows that neither of the variables
meant to measure demographic diversity—racial or economic—is statistically related to ideological
diversity. Regressing ideological diversity on each of these variables individually and jointly further
support this claim. Table A.6 in Appendix A shows no relationship between racial diversity and
ideological diversity. It also shows that, if anything, economic diversity is negatively associated with
ideological diversity. These findings provide further evidence that demographic diversity does not
predict ideological diversity.
I estimate a model with a full set of control variables in Model 6 of Table 2.2. Even including
this set of control variables, the inverse-U relationship between urbanization and ideological diversity
in the states persists. A positive, statistically significant relationship between the college-educated
population and the ideological diversity also remains. None of the added control variables in the
model are found to be statistically significantly related to the dependent variable.
Including variables for urbanization, education levels, and citizen ideology may introduce issues
of multicollinearity, since all of these factors are positively correlated. To account for this possibility,
I calculated the variance inflation factors for all terms in Model 6. Though the variance inflation
factors for the percent urban variable and its squared term were calculated at 127 and 138 respectively
(high values are expected from an interaction term), the variance inflation factors for all remaining
variables ranged from 1.20 to 3.07. The results indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern for
these model specifications.
As an additional robustness check, I replicate these models using several alternative measures of
the dependent and independent variables. Table A.7 in Appendix A shows similar results using an
alternative measure of ideological diversity calculated by Levendusky and Pope (2010) for the year
2006. The results are largely consistent with the results above in the sign of the coefficients, though
large standard errors (likely due to the decreased sample size) do not allow the null hypotheses to be
rejected in all cases.
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Finally, it could be the case that the results hinge on the measurement of education levels in
the population using college education levels. However, results from the CCES and ANES above
indicated that overall education levels, not college education alone, predicted greater ideological
extremity. As a final robustness check, I estimate a series of models in Table A.8 of Appendix
A measuring the relationship between education and ideological diversity at different levels of
education—the percent of college-educated residents, the percent of residents holding a high school
diploma, and the percent of residents holding a graduate or professional degree. The results show
that the percent of high school graduates in a state is positively associated with greater ideological
diversity, controlling for the other variables in the model, but the estimate is not statistically significant
at the .05 level of confidence. The percent of residents holding graduate and professional degrees is
positively and significantly related to ideological diversity. In essence, changing how state education
levels are measured makes few substantive changes to the results.
Altogether, these findings provide support for both the first and second hypotheses. Mostly
rural and mostly urban states have ideologically homogeneous populations, while states with mixed
populations are more ideologically diverse. Once social context is accounted for, education levels are
found to be positively associated with an increase in ideological diversity. Moreover, racially and
economically diverse populations are found not to be more ideologically diverse.
That being said, the results from Table 2.2 should be interpreted cautiously. While multicollinear-
ity appears not to be a problem in these model specifications, many of the independent variables are
nonetheless moderately and positively correlated. The finding for the education variable is condi-
tional upon other variables being included in the model, and so could be the result of unobserved
dependencies in the data. However, there is little to be done to address this issue, since I use data for
the full population of states over multiple years. The analysis is limited by the observational data
available.
Discussion
Previous studies have been content to assume that demographic diversity is equivalent to ideo-
logical diversity. Departing from previous work, I have provided evidence that ideological diversity
is a consequence of urbanization and education levels in populations, while finding no evidence that
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racially or economically diverse electorates are also more ideologically diverse. Using individual-
level results from the American National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study, I have shown that more educated individuals hold more extreme ideological positions. Transi-
tioning to an aggregate analysis, I showed that more educated state populations are more ideologically
diverse. These findings add to the range of studies showing that demographic diversity is not related
to ideological diversity empirically (Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Koetzle,
1998), but advances a step further by providing an alternative theoretical explanation. Although this
account does not explain why communities collectively adopt liberal or conservative outlooks, it
does explain how citizens move from political predispositions to form coherent ideologies that, in
the aggregate, appear as greater ideological diversity in the population.
Scholars should take care in interpreting the results presented here. While the work presents
consistent evidence of correlations between urbanization, education levels, and ideological diversity,
the evidence here is better interpreted as suggestive of causal relationships than as establishing
causality. Selection effects, such as the self-selection of individuals into higher levels of education
or into state populations, undoubtedly exist in the data generating process. However, this work
constitutes a first step towards understanding the variation in ideological diversity across states using
insights from the literatures on geographic polarization (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003; Pearson-
Merkowitz and McTague, 2008; Myers, 2013) and education and ideology (Converse, 1964; Zaller,
1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Finally, the results are contingent upon a narrow definition
of ideological diversity as variance in citizen positions along a left-right ideological spectrum.
Alternative definitions of ideological diversity are likely to yield different results. For example it
seems plausible, if not likely given previous research on public opinion and racial issues (Kinder
and Sanders, 1996; Griffin and Newman, 2008), that racial diversity should be related to ideological
diversity if it is defined specifically on a racial dimension.
These findings have implications for economic inequality in representation. Lawmakers rep-
resenting ideologically diverse districts tend to respond less to average constituency preferences
(Gerber and Lewis, 2004), more closely toe the party line in roll-call voting (Harden and Carsey,
2012), and position themselves to mobilize supporters rather than persuade swing voters (Ensley,
2012). When such lawmakers are unconstrained by their constituencies from taking more extreme
ideological or partisan positions, they tend to represent narrow ideological factions in their district.
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Evidence here (and elsewhere) shows that more ideologically extreme people have also completed
higher levels of education. Education levels tend to correlate with family income and social class.
Therefore, ideological representation likely also corresponds with the representation of the views
of economically privileged citizens, a point echoed by Harden (2016). The present work suggests
a mechanism by which officeholders take more extreme views and come to represent the views of
upper-class Americans at the expense of lower-class Americans (Rigby and Wright, 2013).
Finally, the present work has implications for polarization in the electorate. To the extent that
American voters have polarized, this study points out a potential contributing factor: increasing
education levels. As Americans have become more educated over the last half century, largely
through the rapid expansion of access to institutions of higher education, they have been better able
to absorb cues from political elites and align their views to consistently match those of their parties.
Polarization in the electorate may be aggravated by more highly educated citizens adopting more
ideological views. Pundits and activists often tout civic education as a solution to contemporary
political problems. However, this study suggests that increasing civic education may have a dark
side. Given that citizens tend to use motivated reasoning to reinforce previously held beliefs, further
educating the public on matters of politics may only serve to drive citizens into distinct ideological
camps.
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CHAPTER 3: PARTISAN ATTITUDES AND RHETORIC: HOW CANDIDATES
CAMPAIGN IN RACIALLY DIVERSE DISTRICTS
Most candidates for elected office in the U.S. affiliate with one of the two major political
parties, and with good reason. Party affiliation helps candidates qualify for the ballot, allows them
to receive party funds, and brings them the support of a ready-made coalition of partisan voters
(Aldrich, 2011; Masket, 2009; Wright and Schaffner, 2002). In communicating with voters, however,
some candidates proudly advertise their partisanship while others do everything they can to play
down their affiliation. What explains the divergence in partisanship in campaign messaging among
party-affiliated candidates?
This paper advances the argument that constituency diversity increases the electoral incentives
for candidates to run as more committed partisans. Candidates work to increase electoral support
by making appeals to politically conscious social groups (Fenno, 1978; Miler, 2010; Hersh and
Schaffner, 2013). When a more diverse variety of social groups resides in their districts, candidates
advertise their partisanship to emphasize the shared political interests of the social groups that align
with their party. When districts are more homogeneous, candidates deemphasize their partisanship
and emphasize their commitment to the dominant social group in their district, whose support alone
can win them the election.
I provide evidence that the racial diversity of constituencies influences the content of candidates’
campaign platforms as well as their attitudes toward partisanship. I gather data from two sources,
both focused on 2016 state legislative candidates. First, I collect textual data from language posted
on state senate candidates’ campaign websites. I use the Wordfish scaling algorithm (Slapin and
Proksch, 2008) to derive a measure of the partisan extremity of candidate policy positions. The
results show that candidates present themselves as more extreme partisans in more diverse districts,
but that the relationship is conditional on the population of the district. Second, as part of a survey of
candidates conducted by Broockman et al. (2016), I asked candidates whether they believe elected
officials should prioritize their party’s preferences or their constituency’s preferences when making
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political decisions. Analysis of the survey responses tentatively indicates that candidates running
in more racially diverse districts are more likely to favor party representation over constituency
representation if elected to office.
Previous research tends to assume that candidates’ incentives to appeal for votes from a certain
social group in their constituency vary directly with the size of that group in their district (Fenno,
1978; Carsey, 2000). In contrast, the findings here provide evidence that the incentives to vie for a
group’s support depend on the distribution of voters across social groups and the alignment of those
groups with a major party coalition. The findings have theoretical implications for our understanding
of party polarization in government and substantive implications for the representation of racial and
ethnic minorities in the United States.
Social Groups, Party Coalitions, and Candidate Strategy
Candidates win electoral contests by maximizing voter support, but run in a complex infor-
mational environment where the array of voter preferences and priorities is unclear. To simplify
their task, candidates learn the size and preferences of the social groups present in their districts
(Fenno, 1978; Miler, 2010; Carsey, 2000). For the purposes of political study, a social group is,
according to Karol (2009), “a self-aware collection of individuals who share intense concerns about
a particular policy area” (9). These features of social groups—self-awareness and intense shared
preference—are necessary for group members to act collectively to make policy demands of party
elites and officeholders.
Candidates learn the demographic composition of their electorate in order to make more targeted
campaign appeals to the social groups whose support they think they can win. In fact, many
candidates structure their campaigns to emphasize issues that highlight demographic cleavages in
their electorates with the goal of mobilizing potential supporters along group lines (Carsey, 2000).
They can appeal to social groups substantively by promising support for (or if already in office,
delivering action on) group issue priorities (Hansen and Treul, 2015). They can also make symbolic
appeals to groups (Nteta and Schaffner, 2013; Hersh and Schaffner, 2013), for example by making
positive public statements about the group or by touting endorsements from prominent group leaders.
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Candidates consider the costs and benefits of appealing to various groups of citizens. They
may opt to run a candidate-centered campaign by emphasizing their personal distinctiveness and
performance in office, thereby soliciting support across group divisions (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina,
1987; Carsey, Winburn, and Berry, 2016). However, building a personal reputation requires large
investments of time, money, and social capital. Media pay scant attention to contests further down
the ballot than statewide offices (Squire and Moncrief, 2010). Paid advertisements may sway some
voters in the absence of other information (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991), but campaign cash is
often insufficient (especially for state and local offices) to purchase enough ads in the short term to
construct a distinctive, broadly recognizeable brand for a candidate. Organizing an idiosyncratic
district coalition through personal meetings with voters and group leaders remains a possibility, but
the strategy requires repeated interactions with voters over time. This strategy is more feasible in
small districts with a few thousand voters, where candidates could reasonably come into contact with
a large percentage of their constituents, than in large districts with hundreds of thousands of voters.
Rather than spending time and money expanding support to more social groups in their geo-
graphic constituency, candidates may opt to mobilize their reelection constituency, or the set of voters
whose support they already have (Fenno, 1978). Generally speaking, candidates bear lower costs
in reaching voters by appealing to the combination of social groups already organized into party
coalitions than by attempting to build an idiosyncratic winning majority (Aldrich, 2011). Social
groups provide the foundation of party coalitions in American politics (Achen and Bartels, 2016;
Karol, 2009; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Bishin, 2009;
Bawn et al., 2012). Parties win elections by uniting the support of members of various social groups
behind a common agenda (Axelrod, 1972; Brooks and Manza, 1997; Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi,
1986). When a majority coalition is either no longer sustainable or ceases to constitute a majority,
parties adopt new issue positions in order to appeal to new groups. Historically, the two parties in the
U.S. have shifted positions on issues of race, trade, and abortion in attempts to attract new groups
of voters to support the parties (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Karol, 2009; Miller and Schofield,
2003). The precise contribution of specific groups to party coalitions varies somewhat across regions
(Conger, 2010; Jackson and Carsey, 2002), though groups generally tend to support the same party
nationwide.
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The vast majority of legislative candidates in the U.S. (and an even larger percentage of successful
candidates) affiliate with one of the major parties because of the many electoral benefits party
affiliation brings. When it comes to legislative elections, candidates adopt party labels both to
mobilize partisan supporters to turn out and vote. Party labels reduce decision making costs for voters
when choosing between candidates in a long, often unfamiliar, set of electoral races (Aldrich, 2011;
Schaffner, Streb, and Wright, 2001). Working through party organizations also brings commitment
from activists and donors who fund the campaign, build communication infrastructure, and participate
in get-out-the-vote efforts like canvassing and phone banking (Masket, 2009).
Though party affiliation brings many benefits, it also costs candidates the support of the voters
identifying with the opposite party. Partisan candidates remain constrained by the social group
commitments of their party. Candidates appealing to groups outside their party’s coalition will suffer
from a lack of credibility. If a group’s issue priorities hold no place on the party agenda (or if party
leaders actively antagonize the group to win support from other voters), group members will be
suspicious of the candidate’s commitment or ability to make progress on achieving group goals
while in office. Group members will regard the outreach as pandering and remain loyal to their
own party at the next election. Moreover, appeals to groups outside the party coalition would raise
eyebrows among the candidate’s partisan supporters. The partisan base will question the candidate’s
commitment to the party and may waver in support. Party activists, for instance, may choose to field
a primary challenger to the incumbent candidate in the next election.
Campaign Strategies in Diverse and Homogeneous Districts
Candidates have the options of running as a committed partisan, running as a constituency-
minded independent, or balancing the two extremes in a way that appeals to potential voters. The
characteristics of their electorates influence their campaign strategy choice (Fenno, 1978). In
particular, the diversity of social groups present in the district influences candidates’ decisions
(Fiorina, 1974). Legislative districts vary widely in the diversity of the populations that live there.
Some districts are composed primarily of rural farmers, or of university employees and students, or
of wealthy suburbanites. Other districts group hundreds of thousands of Americans of various racial
and socioeconomic backgrounds or political orientations into a single constituency.
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Running a winning campaign in diverse districts requires a different strategy than running
one in a homogeneous district. The logic between campaign strategy differences in diverse and
homogeneous districts follows a line of scholarship on ideological diversity15 (Gerber and Lewis,
2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Ensley, 2012; Kirkland, 2014; Harden and Carsey, 2012), which
were themselves built on theories of constituency diversity (Fiorina, 1974; Bond, 1983; Bailey and
Brady, 1998). The scholarship on ideological diversity holds that in districts where citizens hold a
wider range of ideological views, elected officials receive murky signals of average constituency
preferences. Unable to determine a majority preference on any given issue, lawmakers have greater
liberty to respond to influence from other political actors, such as factions within the district (Bailey
and Brady, 1998) or party leaders (Harden and Carsey, 2012). In diverse districts, candidates cannot
please all or even most potential voters on every issue. These candidates focus on identifying and
mobilizing a base constituency that will cast more votes than the other side (Fiorina, 1974; Ensley,
2012; Bailey and Brady, 1998).
The simplest way for a candidate to mobilize a voting majority in diverse districts is to run as
a committed partisan. Parties organize diverse social groups into coalitions with the exact goal of
winning majorities of voters (Bawn et al., 2012; Karol, 2009). Candidates may try to make targeted,
group-based appeals, but relying solely on that strategy may not successfully turn out a voting
majority. Moreover, group-based appeals may cause backlash if other groups perceive a candidate as
prioritizing one group over others (Hersh and Schaffner, 2013).
In contrast, candidates representing more homogeneous districts have greater incentive to
espouse the priorities and preferences of a dominant social group without regard to partisanship.
Homogeneous constituencies send clearer signals of group needs, and candidates work in office to
fulfill those particularistic needs (Kuklinski and Elling, 1977). Candidates here do not need to toe the
party line because they do not need to build electoral coalitions across a wide range of groups to win
their contest. Rather, they simply need the support of a majority of the dominant group in the district.
When a homogeneous district is unaligned with one party or the other, the candidate in that district
has greater incentive to follow constituency guidance, even if it means breaking with their party on
some decisions.
15Researchers also refer to this concept as ideological heterogeneity or ideological variance. For the sake of ease and
consistency, I use the term ideological diversity throughout.
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A caveat is that in districts where the dominant group falls firmly in one party’s coalition or
the other’s, a candidate may or may not run a fully partisan campaign. In line with the idea that
parties are coalitions of social groups (Axelrod, 1972; Bawn et al., 2012), candidates running in
homogeneous districts must make appeals to the dominant party-aligned group. Their position on
group issues would be indistinguishable from taking partisan stances on those same issues. However
on issues important to other groups in the party coalition that are not as well numerically represented
in the district, the candidate may eschew the party position, particularly in cases where there is
intraparty disagreement on an issue between two groups in the same coalition.
Diversity and Competition
A potential confounding factor in the relationship between group diversity in the district and
partisanship in campaign messaging is the level of party competition in the district. Previous research
has discovered a correlation between greater demographic diversity and increased party competition
(Patterson and Caldeira, 1984; Aistrup, 2004). However, not all diverse districts produce serious
competition between candidates of the two parties. Some group divisions in districts occur within
party coalitions while other group divisions occur between party coalitions.
Regardless of the two-party competitiveness of the district, all candidates in diverse districts
have incentives to campaign as partisans. In diverse and competitive districts, candidates of both
parties campaign as partisans to mobilize base voters in their party coalitions to support them. In
diverse and uncompetitive districts, the candidates likely to win emphasize partisanship to maintain
the support of their winning coalition and deemphasize partisanship in homogeneous districts to
maintain the support of the dominant group.
In contrast, candidates’ messaging strategies in homogeneous districts depend on the two-party
competitiveness of the district. In homogeneous and competitive districts, both candidates converge
toward the median voter dominant group. As a result, neither candidate emphasizes partisanship. In
homogeneous and uncompetitive districts, the candidate likely to win also focuses on mobilizing
support among the dominant group.
However, in uncompetitive districts, both diverse and homogeneous, the candidates likely to
lose campaign as partisans. Before candidates decide how to position themselves, they must decide
whether or not to run at all. Given the uphill battle that minority party candidates in uncompetitive
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districts would face, many would choose to sit out the election. However, many of the candidates
who choose to run despite the long odds are clear-eyed about the probability of their losing and have
motivations for running other than winning (Carsey and Berry, 2014; Canon, 1993). One possible
motivation is personal commitment to the party. Activist candidates may be intrinsically motivated to
use their candidacy as a platform to educate voters about party stances. Another possible motivation
is party maintenance—conducting outreach and building election infrastructure in the short term
so that, when political opportunity arises in the long term, the party remains able to capitalize on
their newfound competitiveness. As a consequence, minority party candidates should maintain party
platforms when campaigning to galvanize supporters and keep them energized through future election
cycles, in order to build the competitiveness of the party in the district. Therefore, in either diverse
or homogeneous districts that are strongly aligned with one party, minority party candidates most
motivated by winning would choose not to run, while minority party candidates who choose to run
likely have motivations other than winning, such as party advocacy.
Summary
Candidates win elections by garnering the support of a majority group in the district. In diverse
districts, no social group is dominant; in homogeneous districts, one social group is dominant.
However in either case, a party group might also form a majority of voters. In diverse districts,
the best strategy for a candidate is to unite the support of their fellow partisans. In homogeneous
districts, candidates with a reasonable chance of winning have the option of either uniting the support
of partisans or winning the support of the majority social group (regardless of party). Candidates
unlikely to win running in either homogeneous or diverse districts likely run as sacrificial lambs for
the benefit of their party, and so emphasize their partisanship on the campaign trail. If this argument
is valid, we should expect to observe that candidates in more diverse districts to emphasize partisan
positions on the campaign trail.
Race, Ethnicity, and Partisanship in the United States
I study the case of racial and ethnic groups in the United States as an example of social groups. I
choose this example because of the salience of racial and ethnic group divisions between the major
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parties historically and continuing through recent election cycles. Dating back at least to Martin Van
Buren’s efforts in 1828 to ally his coalition of supporters in New York with Southern slaveholders
to create the Democratic Party (Cohen et al., 2008), the two parties have exploited issues of race to
build electoral coalitions and mobilize voters (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Frymer, 1999; Noel,
2013). Simultaneously, parties have extended conflicts on racial issues to other, ostensibly non-racial
issues in order to galvanize supporters (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Tesler, 2012; Gilens, 1999). As a
result, voters have increasingly split along racial and ethnic lines in supporting one of the two parties
in recent years (Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; though see Hajnal and Lee
2011). To be clear, I do not consider my theory only to apply to racial partisan cleavages. Rather,
I consider race among the many possible group cleavages that my broader, group-based theory of
partisan conflict might explain.
In line with the group diversity explanation, embracing the party brand may be the most effective
way for candidates in racially diverse districts to mobilize supporters. Casting one’s self in the mold
of a loyal partisan voter signals to voters that they support their party’s stances across multiple issues,
including issues of race. It also saves the candidate from making tailored appeals to multiple groups,
particularly if those groups compete for political influence within the same party coalition. Finally,
campaigning in diverse constituencies under the veil of partisanship allows candidates to adhere to
contemporary campaign norms of avoiding explicit racial or racist appeals to voters (Mendelberg,
2001).
Data from State Legislative Candidates
As an empirical test, I observe the relationship between the racial and ethnic diversity of districts
and the attitudes and behavior of partisan candidates for state legislative seats in the 2016 general
election. Understanding the incentives for state legislative candidates to take partisan positions on
the campaign trail is substantively important. States are meaningful political units that elect their
own governments and make important decisions on policy and spending and help to implement
national policy. Partisanship among candidates and elected officials in state-level positions has
important implications for political decisionmaking and policy outcomes in the U.S. State legislators
are also likely to run for higher office later in their careers. They may apply the campaign strategies
46
they develop running for state legislative seats in the future when running for congressional seats,
statewide offices, or the presidency.
Moreover, state-level races provide a good source of empirical evidence for three reasons. First,
state legislators vary widely in their partisanship. On one end of the spectrum, some state legislatures
(like California’s) exhibit greater polarization than the U.S. Congress (Shor and McCarty, 2011). On
the other end of the spectrum, one state senate (Nebraska’s) has nonpartisan elections, and Nebraska
senators exhibit little partisan behavior in office (Wright and Schaffner 2002; though see Masket and
Shor 2015). Assuming that greater variation in the partisanship of legislative behavior correlates
with greater variation in the partisanship of candidate behavior, state legislative candidates should
also provide more observable variation in partisanship than congressional candidates. Second, state
legislative districts vary widely in the diversity and homogeneity of their populations. Because
they tend to be smaller in population on average than congressional districts, they allow for more
observations of homogeneous districts to be included in the analysis relative to congressional districts
(though many state legislative districts are as large and diverse as their congressional analogues).
Partisanship in Campaign Websites
To observe whether candidates present different messaging strategies in racially diverse and
racially homogeneous districts, I gather data describing how candidates present themselves to voters
on campaign websites. Websites are an ideal source of data for candidate presentation because they
present a succinct public face and platform for each candidate (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin, 2009).
Websites are superior to other publicly available language produced by candidates, such as interview
transcripts, because candidates have complete control over the content on their websites. Parties
and consulting groups often provide templates and web infrastructure assistance to candidates, but
decisions over content are left to the candidates and campaign staffers themselves. Campaign websites
transmit more information about candidates than other mainstream media platforms. Broadcast and
print media outlets rarely cover down-ballot races. Most state legislative candidates lack sufficient
campaign funds to wage large-scale advertising campaigns.
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To gather data, I used the online elections database Ballotpedia to identify all primary and
general election candidates in 2016 for open state senate seats in 44 states.16 I rely on state senate
candidates alone for this analysis to reduce the costs of gathering textual data. Moreover, evidence in
the following chapter shows that senators tend to be more moderate on average than their colleagues
in lower chambers. I expect that senators’ tendency to moderate reduces variance in the dependent
variable, creating a harder empirical test of the relationship between group diversity and partisanship
than if both state senate and state house candidate websites were included. I have no reason to
suspect the data-generating process creating observations of partisanship in candidate websites differs
between candidates for upper and lower chambers.
I compiled a database of the URLs (n = 2075) for all general election state senate candidates
using a web search engine. Then, I used wget software to download complete campaign websites
during the week leading up to Election Day in 2016, including text, images, html code, and videos.
I was able to locate URLs for 1471 (70.9%) of the general election candidates.17 Of these 1471
websites, 1274 (86.6%) were successfully downloaded and archived. Candidates affiliated with the
Democratic Party comprised 592 (46.5%) of the final observations, while Republican candidates
accounted for 590 (46.3%) observations. The remaining 92 (7.2%) websites belonged to third-party
or nonpartisan candidates. Because this paper seeks to explain the degree of partisanship among
partisan candidates, these 92 observations were excluded from the following analyses, yielding a
final N-size of 1182.
To create the text files used in the analysis, I filtered the text from a select number of pages
common to most websites. Specifically, I set a rule a priori that only text from home pages, issue
stance/platform pages, biography pages, and pages listing endorsements would be included. The
purpose of this filter was to limit the text to pages that had the potential to contain information about
a candidate’s partisanship. This reduced noise in the model that would be included from other pages
16Like the U.S. Senate, many state senates stagger elections so that only a fraction of the membership (e.g. one half or
one third) stands for election in a given year. Alabama, Maryland, Michigan, and Mississippi elect all state senators to
four-year terms in midterm election years. New Jersey and Virginia hold off-year state legislative elections.
17Websites are not missing at random. Several factors might weigh in a candidate’s decision to expend money or effort
on website creation and maintenance. Long-serving incumbents may see no need to operate a website if name recognition
and public approval are sufficiently high to reelect the candidate to office each year. Candidates may not spend the time and
energy to create a website if they have no opponents for a legislative seat. Candidates may not see the value of a website
in parts of the country where Internet access among the population is limited due to poverty or geographic remoteness.
Future analyses using this source of data should account for the self-selection of candidates into maintaining a website.
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unlikely to contain useful information, such as pages detailing candidate contact information or pages
accepting campaign contributions.
Capturing Partisanship in Candidate Positioning
Political scientists often estimate the positions of elected officials, parties, and other political
actors in a policy space to test spatial models of representation (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Poole and
Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004). Advances in computer-based text analysis
over the last two decades have allowed scholars to use language expressed by political actors to
estimate their positions for use in further quantitative analysis (e.g. Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003;
Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Barbera, 2015). To capture the partisanship of candidates using textual
data from their websites, I estimate candidate positions in a one-dimensional policy space using
Slapin and Proksch’s (2008) Wordfish scaling algorithm.
This text-based measure of candidate positioning in a unidimensional policy space is not a
perfect measure of partisanship. For example, some extreme candidates in the policy space are likely
willing to eschew party positions on key issues, while other more centrist candidates may consistently
support party actions. Using words alone from websites also jettisons other important information,
such as graphic art, photos of the candidate with party leaders, or other visual cues to a candidate’s
partisanship. However, in eras of high polarization, unidimensional policy space measures tend to
capture partisan conflict (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Sparks, 2014). We should expect that a very
partisan candidate would use language placing them on the extremes of the policy space.
A challenge in using automated text analysis to measure partisanship is noisiness in the data.
Because human language is expansive and there are many possible ways to express one idea, noise is
an inherent feature of textual data. Finding any relationship between the independent and dependent
variables using a quantified text measure should constitute a difficult test of the expectations derived
from theory.
Wordfish assumes words are distributed randomly following a Poisson distribution of word
occurences. Though word choice has obvious dependencies in natural language, text analysts
frequently rely on this bag of words assumption to produce robust summaries and analyses of
document characteristics. To prepare the textual data for analysis, I removed punctuation, numbers,
and frequently occurring stopwords using the tm package in R. I also stemmed words and omitted
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Figure 3.1: Candidate Position and District Ideology
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Source: Author’s data collection (candidate position), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) (district ideology). Positive
values of both variables indicate conservative positions while negative values indicate liberal positions.
words not occurring in at least 5% of the texts. Wordfish requires two anchor documents on opposite
sides of the policy space to provide direction.18 To identify two candidates with clearly distinct
partisan positions, I consulted ideal point estimates created by Shor and McCarty (2011) based on
state legislative voting records. For the Democratic anchor, I chose Colorado State Senator Angela
Williams (Shor and McCarty score: -1.991). For the Republican anchor, I chose Utah State Senator
Jake Anderegg (Shor and McCarty score: 1.651). The scaling algorithm successfully converged to
produce position estimates for all but one of the candidates. Estimates are standardized with a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of 1. They range in value from -4.79 to 2.98.
To check that these text-based measures of candidate positioning are valid, they could be
compared to other existing measures of candidate positions. However, as of yet, widely used
estimates of ideal points for state legislators (Shor and McCarty, 2011) or state legislative candidates
(Bonica, 2013) are not yet available for 2016 candidates. As an alternative approach to validation, I
18For Wordfish to scale documents accurately, the anchors need only be positioned correctly relative to one another.
Unlike in other algorithms, these anchors need not represent the extreme poles of the policy space.
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turn to district ideology. If the estimates validly capture candidates’ positions in a policy space, we
should expect a correlation between the candidate position and the ideology of the district where
the candidates are running. Candidates have electoral incentives to run in line with district opinion,
even if they affiliate with a party at an electoral disadvantage in their district (Downs, 1957). Of
course many candidates run and lose in districts where their position is out of step with public
opinion (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002). We should expect to see a positive, but not strongly
positive, correlation between candidate position and district ideology.
Figure 3.1 plots the relationship between district ideology and candidate position by the party
of each candidate. The horizontal axis displays district ideology as measured by Tausanovitch and
Warshaw (2013), with larger values indicating a more conservative ideology. The vertical axis
displays candidates’ positions estimated through Wordfish, with larger values also indicating more
conservative positions. The scatter plot indicates a good deal of overlap between candidates of both
parties, though Democrats are on average positioned further to the left than Republicans.19 The best
fit line for Democratic candidates indicates that as district ideology becomes more conservative,
the candidates position themselves further to the right. However, the best fit line for Republican
candidates indicates no meaningful relationship betewen district ideology and candidate positioning,
though Republicans do position themselves to the right of Democrats on average in all but the most
conservative districts.
Model Specification and Results
To test the expectation that racial diversity in the district is associated with candidate extremity
on the campaign trail, I create the dependent variable Position Extremity by calculating the absolute
value of the position estimate for each candidate. More extreme positions (those further from the
mean value of zero) should indicate candidates running more partisan campaigns. The observations
used in this analysis are all state senate candidates who ran on a party ticket and operated a campaign
website. Third-party and independent candidates are excluded. I expect that candidates will adopt
19As evidence, I reduced the sample to those candidates running in single-member districts where I was able to collect
data for one Republican running against one Democrat (N = 600). I regressed the position of candidates on their party
affiliation. The results showed a positive, statistically significant relationship between being a Republican candidate and
holding a more conservative position based on the Wordfish estimate (β = 0.15, p = 0.048.)
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more extreme positions when campaigning in more racially diverse districts. I estimate regression
models following the form:
Position Extremity = β0 + β1 · Diversity + Controls + 
Evidence in favor of expectations will come in the form of a positive, statistically significant
coefficient estimate for the independent variable capturing diversity. The estimates of candidate
position extremity are matched to data describing the diversity of candidate districts.
The principal independent variable is the racial diversity of the district. I rely upon a Herfindahl
index, which summarizes the concentration of a population within a number of categories. The
Herfindahl index is calculated:
D = 1−
N∑
i=1
r2i
where D = Diversity, N = number of groups, and r = the size of each group as a percentage of the
population. Higher values of the index indicate a more even distribution of individuals across groups.
Following Trounstine (2016), I include district-level estimates of the populations of five racial and
ethnic groups in the index: whites, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and all others.
In this measure, a perfectly homogeneous district would be assigned a value of 0, and with greater
values of diversity approaching 1. Data for this variable come from the 2015 American Community
Survey, the most recent year for which data was able. Data are aggregated to state legislative district
level by the private firm Social Explorer.
I provide an initial test of the model by providing a plot of the bivariate relationship between
candidate’s position extremity and racial diversity in the district. Figure 3.2 plots the two variables.
The plot shows a small but positive relationship between racial diversity and position extremity.
Moreover, the distribution of Republican and Democratic candidates on the plot indicates that the
association is present for candidates of both parties. The bivariate regression results indicate that a
one-unit increase in racial diversity results in a 0.25-unit increase in position extremity (p = 0.008).
As racial diversity increases from its minimum possible value (0.04) to its maximum (0.76), the value
of position extremity increases by 0.18—an increase of just more than a third of a standard deviation.
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Figure 3.2: Candidate Positioning in Racially Diverse and Homogeneous Districts
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Source: Author’s data collection (candidate position), 2015 American Community Survey.
In terms of candidate behavior, this result indicates that candidates campaigning in more racially
diverse districts on average use slightly more language identifying them as partisans than candidates
in racially homogeneous districts. However, the differences in campaign partisanship are not drastic.
More racially diverse districts might have other characteristics that also incentivize candidates
to run more partisan campaigns. To account for possible confounding factors, I estimate several
multiple regression models including a series of control variables. To distinguish the diversity of the
district from the competitiveness of the district, I create three indicator variables. I gather data on
competitiveness based on 2012 presidential vote share data aggregated to state legislative districts
by the website Daily Kos. I define a Competitive District as one in which Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney’s share of the vote in the district fell between 40% and 60%. The indicator
variable takes a value of 1 for competitive districts and 0 for all others. Second, recognizing that
candidates who are likely to win position themselves differently than those who are likely to lose, I
match the presidential vote share data to the party of the candidate. I create the indicator variable
Likely Winner, where values of 1 indicate Republicans running in districts where Romney received
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more than 60% of the 2012 presidential vote share or Democrats in districts where Romney received
less than 40% of the vote share. I also create the indicator variable Likely Loser, where values
of 1 indicate Republicans running in districts where Romney received less than 40% of the 2012
presidential vote share or Democrats in districts where Romney received more than 60% of the vote
share.
Candidates adjust their advertising strategies to respond to their opponents’ advertising strategies
(Carsey et al., 2011). Candidates who face a partisan opponent in the contest may be more likely
to use partisan language to distinguish themselves from their opponent than candidates running
uncontested. Alternatively, both may moderate their positions to appeal to the median voter (Downs,
1957). I control for campaign context by including an indicator variable for Two-Party Contest.
Candidates have greater incentive to run as committed partisans when their districts are more
ideologically extreme on average. I control for District Extremity, or how liberal or conservative
a district is, by calculating the distance of each district’s average ideology from the mean on a
unidimensional scale of citizen ideology. As a source of data, I use estimates of citizen ideology in
state legislative districts that Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) obtain through multilevel regression
and poststratification. To control for the possibility that candidates of one party adopt more similar
campaign language than candidates of the other, I include a dummy variable for the Party of each
candidate. Values of 1 for this variable denote Republicans and values of 0 denote Democrats.
Because candidates in multimember districts have greater opportunity to win by mobilizing a
subset of the population, I include an indicator variable for Multimember Districts in the model.
Finally, because candidates may need to rely on party brand in larger districts where there is less
opportunity to cultivate a personal vote, I control for District Population, measured in hundreds
of thousands of district residents. Summary statistics for these data are provided in Table B.1 of
Appendix B.
Table 3.1 reports the results.20 I estimate the models using ordinary least squares regression.
Model 1 presents the results with a full set of control variables and the indicator for competitive
20Two of the total 1,182 candidate websites are excluded from the analysis; Wordfish was unable to provide a position
estimate for the first, and the second was an influential outlier. Observations of district competitiveness are missing for
41 candidates in Florida because the state underwent a round of state legislative redistricting between 2012 and 2016. I
replicate the models in Table 3.1 and impute missing values of the competitiveness variables in Table B.2 of Appendix B.
Including the Florida candidates does not meaningfully change the results.
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Table 3.1: District Diversity and Candidate Partisanship in Campaign Website Messaging
Dependent variable:
Position Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity -0.03 -0.04 -0.27∗ -0.28∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Competitive District -0.11∗ -0.11∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Winner 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Loser 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Two-Party Contest -0.07 -0.11∗ -0.08 -0.12∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
District Extremity 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Republican -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Multimember District -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 -0.20
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
District Population 0.02∗ 0.02∗ -0.08∗ -0.08∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Racial Diversity X 0.18∗ 0.19∗
District Population (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.88∗ 0.80∗ 1.01∗ 0.93∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 1139 1139 1139 1139
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
Models estimated using ordinary least squares regression.
districts serving as the control for competition. Here the association between racial and candidate
position extremity appears to be of little substantive or statistical importance. The size of the
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coefficient estimate for racial diversity indicates that, controlling for other factors, a substantively
small and negative relationship between diversity and position extremity, contrary to expectations.
Among the controls, the coefficient estimate for the indicator for competitive districts is signed
in the negative direction and statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence. This result
indicates, controlling for other variables in the model, candidates in competitive districts moderate
their platforms and use less partisan language. A positive and statistically significant coefficient
estimate for the population variable also indicates that candidates in more populous districts also use
more partisan language. The fit of the model, as measured by the adjusted R-squared value, is 0.02,
indicating rather poor model fit (a problem also encountered in subsequent models). The poor fit can
be explained by the noisiness of using textual data to measure the dependent variable.
Model 2 replicates the first model but replaces the competitive district indicator with indicators
for candidates who are likely to win and likely to lose. Again, the coefficient estimate for racial
diversity is substantively small, signed in the negative direction, and not statistically different from
zero. The coefficient estimate for likely winners is positive, in line with expectations, but is not
statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence. The estimate for likely losers is also positive but
in this case statistically significant. This finding means that candidates who are likely to lose position
themselves further on the extremes. Among the remaining controls, the positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the two-party contest variable indicates that candidates running in contests
where one Democrat faces one Republican take more moderate positions. As in Model 1, the
coefficient estimate for district population also indicates that candidates in more populous districts
also use more partisan language.
The first two models provide little evidence in line with expectations. However, according
to the discussion above, candidates rely on galvanizing the support of party-aligned groups when
they do not have the time or resources to build an idiosyncratic coalition of supporters among the
groups in the district. Candidates are more likely to lack the resources to build coalitions in districts
where larger populations live. Candidates would be able to build personal support among a larger
proportion of citizens and groups living in a legislative district with 10,000 voters than in a district
with one million voters. This raises the possibility that racial diversity has the strongest influence on
candidate behavior when candidates must win in more populated districts. Evidence in support of
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Figure 3.3: Conditional Effects of Diversity and Population on Candidate Positioning
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this conditional relationship would be found in a positive, statistically significant coefficient estimate
on the interaction term between the racial diversity and district population variables.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.1 add an interaction term between racial diversity and district
population to the models. In both models, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive
and statistically significant. Because interaction terms are often difficult to interpret on their own, I
present a marginal effect plot for the results from Model 3 in Figure 3.3. The plot indicates that as
the population of a district increases, the positive association between racial diversity and position
extremity increases in size. According to the results, when a district contains a population of about
100,000 voters (close to average), the marginal effect of racial diversity on partisan extremity is close
to zero. However, when a district contains a population closer to a million voters, the marginal effect
of racial diversity on partisan extremity is positive and substantively large. In a district with one
million constituents, a one-unit increase in the value of racial diversity would yield an increase of
two standard deviations in the position extremity of a candidate. Racial diversity is an important
factor in candidate positioning, but only in heavily populated districts. Among the control variables
in these models, all results in Model 3 match those described in Model 1 while all results in Model 4
match the results described in Model 2.
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To assess the robustness of these results, I estimate a multilevel model with state random effects
in Table B.3 of Appendix B. Because candidates for state legislature compete in state-specific political
contexts, it may be important to control for differences in the qualities of campaigns across states.
Again, however, the results of the multilevel model generally provide similar estimates as those
presented in Table 3.1.
The observational nature of the data employed in these analyses, and the covariance between
the independent variable and control variables, makes isolating the causal effects of racial diversity
difficult. To provide more exact estimates of the direct and conditional effects of racial diversity on
candidate positioning, I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012) to balance the
observations. A description of the matching process, a list of the covariates used for matching, and
the results of the post-matching regression analysis are provided in Tables B.6 and B.7 of Appendix
B. The results of the analysis provide additional evidence that the positive effect of racial diversity
on candidate position extremity increases as district population increases.
Candidate Attitudes toward Representation
Candidate positions on the campaign trail have implications for governance if candidates maintain
campaign positions while in office (and evidence suggests candidates do maintain them—see Sulkin
2011). It could be the case that candidates running in diverse districts not only position themselves
as partisans to win election, but also adhere to partisan positions while representing their districts in
office. To assess whether district diversity influences candidates’ priorities in office if they win, I
turn to a survey of state legislative candidates.
In September 2016, Broockman et al. (2016) emailed a survey link to 9,241 people who had
declared their candidacy for state legislature that year (both upper and lower chambers). At my
request, the survey organizers included a question asking candidates about the relative value they
place on partisanship and constituency preferences when making political choices. The survey
required that only candidates take the survey; questions were included to screen campaign staff
from taking the survey on their candidate’s behalf. Partial or full responses were gathered from
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1,319 candidates, resulting in a response rate of 13.4%.21 Compared to the population of candidates,
respondents were slightly more likely to be female (17.8% of females responded vs. 12.9% of
males) and to be running as Democrats (15.0% of Democrats responded vs. 11.8% of Republicans).
Challengers were also slightly more likely to respond to the survey (16.6%) than incumbents (10.5%).
The survey asked candidates how they believe elected officials in their party should act when
it comes to making political decisions. The survey presented candidates with an item containing
two contrasting statements. On one end of the five-point scale was the statement, “When making
decisions on important issues, elected officials should represent the views of their constituents.” On
the other end of the scale was the statement, “When making decisions on important issues, elected
officials should represent the core principles of and the core groups in their party.” The survey asked
candidates to place themselves on the scale to indicate which statement better fit their views. Of the
1,319 respondents, 813 (61.6%) provided responses to this question. I create the dependent variable
Party Prioritization by coding responses such that higher values indicate a stronger belief that elected
officials should represent party views over constituency views.
Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of candidates’ responses. The horizontal axis indicates the
point on the scale between constituency representation and party representation at which candidates
placed themselves, while the vertical axis indicates the percent of candidates in each scale point. The
distribution of responses is right-skewed; roughly 60% of candidates indicated a belief that elected
officials should always or mostly represent the views of constituents when making decisions. Another
roughly 30% of candidates indicated a belief that elected officials should balance constituency and
party evenly when making decisions. Finally, just under 10% of candidates indicated a belief that
elected officials should always or mostly represent partisan views in office.
It is possible that the skewness of the responses indicates a social desirability bias on the part of
the respondents. It may also be the case that some candidates perceive no meaningful distinction
between representing their constituency and siding with their party in the legislature. While there
are clear tradeoffs between partisanship and constituency representation for some candidates, there
may not be for others. If this is the case, candidates would likely default to siding with constituency
21This response rate falls roughly in line with the response rates to the 2012 and 2014 iterations of the survey (see
Broockman and Skovron, 2013; Carnes and Hansen, 2016). It also matches or exceeds the response rate of similar surveys
of state legislators in recent years (e.g. Butler and Powell, 2014; Harden, 2016).
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Figure 3.4: Candidates’ Representational Priorities
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Source: 2016 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al., 2016). Candidates were asked to indicate on a five-point scale
where their views fell between these two statements: (a) “When making decisions on important issues, elected officials
should represent the views of their constituents.” (b) “When making decisions on important issues, elected officials should
represent the core principles of and the core groups in their party.”
representation in the abstract due to democratic norms, even if their actions belie that abstract belief.
In any case, the constrained variance in candidates’ responses should provide a hard test of the
expected relationship between district diversity and party prioritization.
To test the expectation that candidates in diverse districts plan to prioritize partisanship, I merged
candidate responses to the data describing the racial diversity of their districts. As in the website
analysis, I use Trounstine’s (2016) measure of racial diversity and gather data from the American
Community Survey. If candidates in more diverse districts run more partisan campaigns, we should
expect to see candidates answer that they prioritize partisanship over constituency representation in
more diverse districts.
Figure 3.5 presents the bivariate results. The vertical axis displays candidate responses on the
five-point scale, ranging from pro-party responses on the bottom to pro-constituency responses on the
top. The horizontal axis displays the measure of racial diversity in the district. Each bar represents
the average district diversity for candidates by response category. The figure indicates that as the
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Figure 3.5: Candidates’ Representational Priorities by District Racial Diversity
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Source: 2015 American Community Survey, 2016 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al., 2016). Candidates were
asked to indicate on a five-point scale where their views fell between these two statements: (a) “When making decisions
on important issues, elected officials should represent the views of their constituents.” (b) “When making decisions on
important issues, elected officials should represent the core principles of and the core groups in their party.’
racial diversity of a candidate’s district increases, the candidate is more likely to express a view that
elected officials should represent the principles and groups within their party. The direction of the
association falls in line with expectation, though the size of the association is modest. Candidates
who prioritize partisanship run in slightly more racially diverse districts on average (D = 0.41) than
their constituency-prioritizing counterparts (D = 0.32).
Of course, several other external factors might confound this relationship between candidate
attitudes and district diversity. First, candidates perceptions are shaped in part by the actions of
political opponents. Because partisan candidates facing contestation for a seat may be more likely
to perceive a need to represent and mobilize a partisan base, I control for competition using two
different indicators. Contested is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the observed candidate
faces any general election opponent. Two-Party Contest is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if the observed candidate faces a general election opponent from the other major party. Second,
candidates running in very liberal or very conservative districts may see little distinction between
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constituency views and party views compared to candidates running in more moderate districts. I
control for District Extremity, which is the district’s ideological distance from the mean district based
on estimates of district ideology produced by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013). Third, Democratic
and Republican candidates may have ideological differences on the primacy of constituency views
compared to party views. I control for the party of the candidate by including a dummy variable with
values of 1 indicating a Republican candidate.
Fourth, compared to candidates in single member districts, where one elected official represents
all constituents, candidates in multimember districts may view it as their job to represent the views of
a subconstituency and leave other officials to represent other subconstituencies. I include a dummy
variable with a value of 1 indicating candidates running in Multimember Districts. Fifth, because
the survey was sent to both state senate and state house candidates, I add an indicator variable
for candidates running for seats in the Upper Chamber of their state’s legislature, based on the
expectation that senators will display more moderation in their political stances than representatives.
Sixth, candidates running in more populated districts may focus their efforts on representing a
subconstituency instead of an entire constituency, since larger districts are more likely to have a
wider range of constituent interests. I control for District Population, using American Community
Survey data to measure constituency populations by hundreds of thousands of constituents. Finally, I
add an indicator variable for Incumbents. Responses to the question of elected officials’ priorities
might vary significantly between candidates who have experience serving in office and candidates
without that experience. Summary statistics for all variables used in the survey analysis are presented
in Table B.4 of Appendix B. The model takes the following form:
Party Prioritization = β0 + β1 · Diversity + Controls + 
Evidence in line with expectations will come in the form of a positive, statistically significant
coefficent estimate for the diversity variable.
The results of the OLS regression model are reported in Table 3.2. I estimate two models,
each using a different variable to control for contestation in the district. In line with expectations,
the coefficient estimate for the diversity variable is positive. Though statistically different from
zero, the substantive relationship between diversity and partisanship is modest. The results in
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Table 3.2: Self-Reported Candidate Priorities
Dependent variable:
Party Prioritization
(1) (2)
Racial Diversity 0.41∗ 0.41∗
(0.19) (0.19)
Contested 0.11
(0.09)
Two-Party Contest 0.09
(0.09)
District Extremity 0.23 0.24
(0.16) (0.16)
Republican -0.15∗ -0.15∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Multimember District 0.16 0.17
(0.09) (0.09)
Upper Chamber 0.04 0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
District Population -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Incumbent 0.12 0.12
(0.08) (0.08)
Constant 1.85∗ 1.87∗
(0.13) (0.13)
Observations 813 813
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Data
come from the 2016 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al., 2016).
both models indicate that a one-unit change in diversity (the entire range of the variable) results
in an increase of 0.41 in the value of the dependent variable. Moving from the minimum (0.03)
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to maximum (0.74) observed value of the racial diversity among the surveyed candidates’ districts
results in a 0.29 increase in the value of the dependent variable. The racial diversity of their district
matters to candidates’ beliefs on whether elected officials should represent party or constituency
preferences when it comes to political decision making, but candidates’ predisposition to offer
partisan representation increases marginally in more racially diverse districts.
Turning to the control variables, the results show that Republicans are significantly less likely
than Democrats to agree with the party over constituency view, though the difference here is also
substantively small. None of the coefficient estimates for the other control variables are statistically
significant. The coefficient estimates for both variables measuring competition (contestation and
two-party contestation) are positively signed, suggesting that candidates are more inclined to offer
partisan representation in office when faced with greater competition for office. The results also
suggest that candidates in more ideologically extreme districts are more inclined to represent party
principles in office, though this estimate too is not statistically different from zero.
As a robustness check, I provide the results of the same model specifications in Table 3.2
calculated using ordered logistic regression in Table B.5 of Appendix B. The coefficient estimates
in this model are largely signed in the same direction, and a comparison of the BIC values for
the OLS and ordered logit models indicate improved model fit using ordered logit. However, the
coefficient estimates for the diversity variable are no longer statistically significant at the 0.05 level
of confidence. In contrast with the OLS results, the ordered logit results also indicate that candidates
in multimember districts are more predisposed to representing party beliefs in office.
Overall, the analysis of the survey data provides suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that
candidates running in racially diverse districts prioritize party representation over constituency
representation. I observe only a marginal positive shift in party prioritization among candidates
running in more racially diverse districts. Moreover, the model fit is rather poor; the adjusted R-
squared value in both models in Table 3.2 is 0.01. As mentioned above, the distribution of candidate
responses in line with prioritizing constituency representation (shown in Figure 3.4) provide a hard
test of the relationship. It may also be the case that candidates do not meaningfully distinguish
between partisan representation and constituency representation. More evidence will be needed to
determine conclusively whether candidates’ perceptions of district diversity influence their plans for
office.
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Discussion
Candidates find it in their interest to expand their electoral support to as many voters as possible.
Unless candidates can build an idiosyncratic, winning coalition of social groups in their districts,
party affiliation remains a more viable path to victory. Party affiliation brings the support of some
social groups but opposition from others. Candidates running in districts that are home to a more
diverse array of social groups have incentives to emphasize their partisanship in their campaign
messaging, either to emphasize common interests among groups within their party’s coalition or to
mobilize a partisan base on Election Day. Candidates running in more homogeneous districts have
greater incentive to downplay their partisanship and focus on mobilizing members of the dominant
group in their district.
To provide evidence, I compared how state legislative candidates campaigned in racially diverse
and racially homogeneous districts. I used data from state senate candidates’ campaign websites
to estimate the extremity of their positions in a one-dimensional policy space defined by partisan
conflict. The results indicated that candidates use more partisan language when running in more
racially diverse districts, but that the association between diversity and partisanship is strongest in
populous districts. I also used data from a survey of state legislative candidates. The results suggested
that candidates in more racially diverse districts were more likely to agree with the view that elected
officials should represent the interests of their party over the interests of their constituency, but the
results are inconclusive.
This study has several limitations. The evidence presented here is best considered suggestive
of an association between diversity and partisanship, rather than a clear demonstration of causality.
While both survey and text results indicated that district diversity is associated with candidate
partisanship, model fit was poor in both sets of analyses. Clearly, many other factors shape candidate
attitudes and campaign language. Then again, the model fit may simply be a consequence of
measuring concepts with noisy survey and text data. The analysis is limited by design only to
examine one type of social diversity (racial diversity) in one type of elected office (state legislative
seats). Future work may consider expanding the test to other forms of social diversity and other
offices. Finally, these analyses are limited only to general election candidates. Future work might
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also consider how primary election candidates, and the early competition they produce within parties,
shape general election campaign strategies.
These findings have implications for efforts to reform the redistricting process by curbing gerry-
mandering practices. Though reformers argue that politically homogeneous districts produce more
extreme candidates, these findings highlight how politically diverse districts can also produce more
extreme candidates. The results suggest that drawing more diverse districts may counterintuitively
serve to increase polarization among elected officials. Regardless of the homogeneity or diversity of
the district, the results do suggest that drawing districts that are competitive between both parties
will help to reduce polarization.
Finally, the results suggest that growing racial diversity in the U.S. over the past half century may
help to explain growing polarization over that same period. When more legislators represent diverse
districts, more legislators have electoral incentives to side with their party. As more legislators
become committed partisans, polarization between the two parties in governing institutions grows.
The results presented in this chapter are suggestive of a relationship between racial diversity and
greater partisanship, but not conclusive. However, I test this theory in a different context in the next
chapter, where I examine the voting records of elected legislators who represent racially diverse and
racially homogeneous districts.
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CHAPTER 4: RACIAL DIVERSITY AND PARTY POLARIZATION: EVIDENCE STATE
LEGISLATIVE VOTING RECORDS
Almost all elected legislators in the United States, both at the federal and state levels, affiliate
with either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. The incentives for party affiliation are
many. In elections, partisans more easily qualify for ballots, are more likely to win, and have greater
access to campaign resources (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright, 2001; Masket, 2009; Aldrich, 2011).
In office, partisans can gain institutional power by working through party caucuses. Despite nearly
universal party affiliation, some legislators work tirelessly to advance their party’s agenda in office
while other legislators frequently distance themselves from party leaders on key votes and actions.
Why do some legislators exhibit greater partisanship in office than others?
Because of the primacy of winning reelection in motivating legislative decisions, explanations
for legislative behavior are often found in the composition of their constituencies (Miller and Stokes,
1963; Fenno, 1978; Clinton, 2006). This chapter presents the case that the diversity of social groups
in a legislators’ district creates incentives for legislators to act as partisans. Legislators work to signal
their support to the groups of constituents who can help them win reelection. When representing
diverse districts, legislators act as committed partisans to signal support to the range of groups that
form their party’s coalition. When representing homogeneous districts, legislators only need to
signal support to the social group that forms a majority of voters, removing electoral incentives for
legislators to act with their parties on many issues. In the aggregate, more polarized parties should
govern more diverse populations since fewer individual legislators have electoral incentives to defect
from party actions.
For evidence, I turn to the voting records of state legislators using data from Shor and McCarty
(2011). Studying state legislators allows me to gather evidence both at the district level to test
expectations of individual behavior and at the state level to test expectations of party polarization in
the aggregate. I use data on the racial and ethnic diversity of districts as an example of social group
diversity. The results show that both Democratic and Republican legislators who represent racially
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diverse districts hold more partisan voting records. The results further show that the two parties are
more polarized in legislative chambers that govern more racially diverse populations.
The findings provide evidence that legislators cast roll-call votes with respect to the social
groups in their districts, above and beyond the ideological proclivities of voters. Studies of diversity
within constituencies (Fiorina, 1974; Bond, 1983; Bailey and Brady, 1998; Gerber and Lewis, 2004;
Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Kirkland, 2014) have debated whether
diversity is best measured in terms of demographics or ideology. This study demonstrates that both
ideological diversity and racial diversity play independent roles in shaping legislative decisionmaking.
Substantively, the analysis suggests that as the U.S. population becomes more racially diverse in
coming years, polarization between the two parties will increase.
Groups, Parties, and Representation
The two major political parties in the U.S. have polarized over the past several decades, jeop-
ardizing the ability of politicians at all levels of government to agree on solutions to the nation’s
pressing problems. Many different factors contribute to polarization (Theriault, 2008), including
extremism among activists (Layman et al., 2010), institutional rule changes (Lee, 2009; Roberts and
Smith, 2003), and sorting and redistricting (Bishop, 2008; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003;
Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Carson et al., 2007).
Political disagreement among voters is at least partially responsible for increased polarization,
though debates over the exact mechanism persist (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2009). Several
studies point to ideological diversity22 within electorates as a source of polarization in Congress and
state legislatures (Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012;
Ensley, 2012; Kirkland, 2014). Under this explanation, officeholders whose constituents disagree
more on the issues boast more ideologically extreme voting records. For these legislators, some
large segment of their electorate will disagree with them no matter what decision they make. They
are more likely to win reelection by making decisions that excite and turn out a committed base of
ideological voters. Partisan legislators who try to find middle ground often garner lackluster support
from their own party’s voters and encounter sustained opposition from voters in the other party.
22Researchers also refer to this concept as ideological heterogeneity or ideological variance. For the sake of ease and
consistency, I use the term ideological diversity throughout.
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Theories of ideological diversity build from an assumption that legislators know how ideological
loyalties are distributed across their electorates. It is undeniable that legislators have a good general
impression of the political loyalties of their constituents, but their perceptions of their districts rely
on imperfect heuristics and are subject to cognitive biases (Miler, 2010). In fact, legislators tend to
misestimate how liberal or conservative their constituents are on average (Broockman and Skovron,
2013). One heuristic legislators use to understand voters’ preferences and priorities is the composition
of the social groups that make up their districts. When it comes to the study of politics, social groups
are “self-aware collections[s] of individuals who share intense concerns about a particular policy
area,” by Karol’s (2009, 9) definition. Interviews with members of Congress and their staff reveal
that legislators think of and discuss their constituencies not only in ideological terms, but also in
terms of the groups that reside in their districts (Fenno, 1978; Miler, 2010)
Legislators recognize and acknowledge those groups through a variety of legislative activities
(Eulau and Karps, 1977; Harden, 2016). Among legislators’ options are sponsoring bills on issues
important to a given group (e.g. Hansen and Treul, 2015), allocating funds for projects important to
the group (e.g. Grose, 2011), or hiring descriptive representatives of the group to their staffs (e.g.
Canon, 1999). When the social group composition of legislators’ constituencies shifts (as it can
during redistricting), legislators change their issue agendas to better reflect the priorities of their new
constituencies (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin, 2010).
Representing Diverse and Homogeneous Populations
Legislators are motivated to signal shared issue stances and priorities to enough potential voters
in their districts to win reelection. However, few voters care strongly about the day-to-day decisions
that legislators make on a variety of issues. Because most decisions do not matter to most voters, it
is more important for legislators to signal through their actions that they are on the same side as a
majority of voters. Doing so reassures voters that, if an issue emerged in the future that those voters
care strongly about, the legislator would share their views and act in accordance.
Sending a clear signal of which side a legislator is on is an easier job in some districts than others.
Some districts are incredibly diverse, containing voters with a wide range of lived experiences and
political opinions. Other districts are more socially and politically homogeneous. Voters in these
districts tend to share common identities, sources of economic support, and political views.
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When representing districts that are home to a more diverse array of social groups, legislators
have greater incentive to send a clear signal of steadfast partisanship to their constituents. By
signalling partisanship, legislators commit to representing the multiple social groups who comprise
their party’s coalition. Though social groups have their own interests and priorities, many also
affiliate with one of the major parties. Parties function as coalitions of social groups that create
potential popular majorities and make it possible for groups to gain representation from majorities
within government institutions (Bawn et al., 2012; Karol, 2009; Achen and Bartels, 2016; Miller and
Schofield, 2003). Voters who identify with party-aligned social groups tend to vote in majorities,
though not uniformly, for their party’s candidates. Acting as a committed partisan across issues
unites support among partisan voters, rather than sending a signal to voters that the legislator cares
about some particular group more than others.
When the district is homogeneous, legislators have greater incentive to signal their support for the
majority social group in their district. Legislators are electorally constrained to signal support for the
dominant group on the set of issues it cares about, though they may have liberty to act on other issues
that the group cares less about. If the dominant group is aligned with a major party, the district’s
representative could reasonably position herself as a strict partisan or as a constituency-focused
representative. In these cases, there would be no tradeoff between a legislator taking a partisan stance
and taking a constituency-focused stance on an issue. However, the legislator may have room to
diverge from the party on issues that are not salient to the dominant group in their constituency. If
the dominant group is not aligned with a party, and especially if it opposes the legislator’s party on
some set of key issues, the legislator would be constrained to prioritize voting with the preferences
of the dominant group over voting with their party’s position. On issues for which they face no
constituency constraints whatsoever, legislators might choose in these situations to bow to pressure
from party leaders, logroll votes with colleagues, respond to pressure from interest groups, or vote
their conscience.
Voting Records and Party Polarization
Roll-call votes provide an example of legislative behavior in which legislators can signal their
partisanship. Legislators’ voting records over time reveal the extent to which they side with their
party on the issues. While many votes in legislatures are unanimous, many others are votes contested
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along party lines. Roll-call votes on these contested issues force legislators to pick a position on
the public record that falls either with or against party leadership. Parties exert strong influence
over legislators’ decisions within lawmaking institutions, independent of shared ideology (see also
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Jenkins 1999, 2008; Rohde 1991; Wright and Schaffner
2002; though see Krehbiel 1993). Party caucuses help legislators overcome organizational challenges
to coordinate agendas and votes in order achieve common policy goals (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).
Particularly on non-ideological, procedural votes, legislators toe the party line in order to support the
party agenda (Lee, 2009). The finality and transparency of votes generally deny legislators the ability
to prevaricate, as they might in an interview or speech (though see Arnold 1990 or Roberts 2007 for
examples of cases where votes obscure legislators’ true positions).
While many legislators find it in their own electoral interests to vote with their parties, others
will buck party pressure if doing so will improve their popularity with their voters. Legislators
risk being booted from office (Carson et al., 2010; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002) or
drawing challengers (Hogan, 2008; Birkhead, 2015) for voting too often on the partisan extremes.
For representatives of homogeneous districts, it is more important to signal group support than to
signal partisanship. For representatives of diverse districts, however, both electoral and institutional
incentives guide their decisions in favor of voting with their party’s leadership.
In the aggregate, this district-level theory of individual legislators’ voting behavior implies that
the two parties will polarize as districts grow more diverse on average. When more legislators must
run for election in diverse districts, more legislators will support party positions on the issues before
them in the legislature and on the campaign trail. Fewer legislators representing homogeneous
districts will occupy more moderate spaces, supporting one party on some issues and the second
party on others. Greater diversity produces more consistently partisan legislators, which in turn
produces more internally homogeneous, polarized parties within legislatures.
Group Diversity and Ideological Diversity
This research contributes to our understanding of diversity and representation by specifically
articulating the role of social groups and party coalitions in producing partisan voting records and
polarization. Previous work has argued that ideologically diverse constituencies elect legislators who
are more likely to deviate from the median voter (Fiorina, 1974; Bailey and Brady, 1998; Gerber and
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Lewis, 2004; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006; Bullock and Brady, 1983) and vote more consistently
with their parties (Harden and Carsey, 2012). The argument goes that representatives of more
ideologically homogeneous districts feel more constrained by public opinion in those districts. As a
result, those legislators hold voting records closer to those preferred by the median voter. Legislators
representing ideologically diverse districts have the freedom to vote on the ideological extremes or
respond more to the demands of party leaders.
This chapter departs from previous accounts by considering diversity in constituencies in terms
of the social groups present in legislators’ constituencies, in addition to citizen ideology. Groups
shape voter behavior in addition to but also independently of voter ideology. Voters are likely to
bring group identities and consciousness to bear in forming a vote choice (Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee, 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Conover, 1988). For some citizens, vote choice may be
more a function of social identity, group consciousness, or symbolic attachments than of ideology
or information (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Achen and Bartels,
2016). As a result, members of social groups may support one party over the other due largely to
group considerations, their positions on issues irrelevant to the group notwithstanding. Legislators
recognize voters’ group attachments and position themselves accordingly. Legislators tend to be
aware of the social groups that comprise their constituencies (Fenno, 1978; Bishin, 2009) and use the
groups present in their districts as heuristics to gauge constituency support when making decisions
(Miler, 2010). If voters think and act in terms of social groups and legislators recognize social
groups in determining how to position themselves, then political scientists should build theories
incorporating social groups into explanations of elite behavior.
To be clear, I do not intend to suggest that ideological diversity plays no role in influencing
legislative decisions. Citizens’ opinion on the issues certainly shape decisionmaking to a certain
extent. Rather, I argue that both the distribution of ideology and distribution of social groups
are distinct pieces of information that legislators use to make choices about representing their
constituencies.
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Race and Partisanship
To test expectations derived from this theory of group diversity, I compare how state legislators
represent racially diverse and racially homogeneous constituencies. Partisan divisions on issues of
race are long-standing and have shifted over time (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Noel, 2013). Since
the 1960s, Democrats have tended to include both African Americans and whites in their coalition
of supporters while Republicans have remained majority white. In recent election cycles, voters of
Hispanic and Asian descent have trended in favor of the Democratic Party (Hajnal and Lee, 2011)
while white voters have trended increasingly towards supporting the Republican Party (Abrajano
and Hajnal, 2015; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014).23 I do not consider my theory only to apply to racial
partisan cleavages. Rather, I consider race among the many possible group cleavages that my broader,
group-based theory of partisan conflict might explain.
In line with the group diversity explanation, embracing the party brand may be the most effective
way for candidates in racially diverse districts to mobilize supporters. Casting one’s self in the mold
of a loyal partisan voter signals to voters that they support their party’s stances across multiple issues,
including issues of race. It also saves the candidate from making tailored appeals to multiple groups,
particularly if those groups compete for political influence within the same party coalition.
Representation in State Legislatures
I gather evidence from the 49 partisan24 state legislatures, which vary widely in the partisan
consistency of legislators and in the polarization of the parties in government. Earlier work observing
how legislators represent diverse constituencies focuses almost exclusively on members of Congress
(though see Kirkland, 2014). Studying other elected officials in the United States provides a greater
number of observations, more variance in observations, and moves towards generalizing the findings
outside the context of the U.S. Congress. While this is not the first study to explore the link
between political differences within electorates and party polarization, this study links diversity and
23It should be noted that support in these works is measured in terms of Presidential vote choice, which does not
necessarily reflect an underlying party identification for minority voters (Hajnal and Lee, 2011). It is also important to
acknowledge that substantial variation in partisan support exists among both Asian American and Latino voters, with
ethnicity or nation of family origin playing a role in determining vote choice.
24The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature is officially nonpartisan.
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polarization while providing empirical evidence at both the micro- and macro-level of analysis.25
States also offer a sufficient number of observations at both the district level (n=7,334) and at the
chamber level (n=98) to conduct statistical analyses. I provide complementing empirical analyses
observing (a) the relationship between individual voting records and district-level racial diversity
and (b) the relationship between state-level racial diversity and party polarization. Substantively,
it is also important to understand the sources of polarization in states, as their elected leaders are
responsible for setting a wide range of social and economic policies that affect the day-to-day lives
of their residents.
District Racial Diversity and Roll-Call Voting
I begin the statistical analysis examining how diversity relates to the partisanship of legislators’
voting records. The unit of analysis is the state legislator. To measure partisanship, I use each
legislator’s ideal point calculated from roll-call voting records by Shor and McCarty (2011).
Ideal points are not a perfect measure of partisanship. Legislators’ roll-call votes include
decisions made in line with their own issue preferences as well as decisions made to support a party
position. However, many roll-call votes in legislatures are cast purely to support partisan action (for
instance on procedural votes) rather than as a sign of ideological commitment (Lee, 2009). Moreover,
evidence from simulated roll-call data suggests that votes mapped into low-dimensionality policy
spaces (such as commonly used unidimensional measures of left-right preferences) better capture
partisan conflict than any other dimension of ideological disagreement (Aldrich, Montgomery, and
Sparks, 2014). Party unity scores, such as those which measure how often members of Congress
vote with a majority of their party, would be the most appropriate (see, for example, Rice, 1925;
Cox and Poole, 2002; Carson et al., 2010). However, state-level roll-call voting data is incredibly
costly to obtain (Clark et al., 2009), and no other scholars have created or released party unity scores
using existing collected data. Ideal points are the best available measure. Though ideal points do not
perfectly measure legislators’ partisanship, we should nonetheless expect that more extreme ideal
points correspond with greater legislator partisanship.
25Kirkland (2014) grounds an analysis of state-level party polarization in a theory of individual legislative behavior, but
provides only a macro-level analysis of the effect of state ideological diversity on chamber polarization. The study does
not provide a micro-level empirical model testing the assumption that ideological diversity within districts produces more
ideologically extreme legislators.
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The dependent variable, Ideal Point Extremity, is the distance of each legislator’s ideal point from
zero, which serves as the mean ideal point for all legislators.26 Cross-sectional data are collected
for all state legislators in the year 2010. The variable ranges from 0 to 2.527, with higher values
representing more extreme voting records. I exclude 163 legislators for whom ideal points are
missing, 23 Independent legislators, and the 49 state legislators in Nebraska, leaving the voting
records of 7,147 legislators.
The principal independent variable is the Racial Diversity of the district population. I rely upon a
Herfindahl index, which summarizes the concentration of a population within a number of categories.
The Herfindahl index is calculated:
D = 1−
N∑
i=1
r2i
where D = Diversity, N = number of groups, and r = the size of each group as a percentage of the
population. Higher values of the index indicate a more even distribution of individuals across groups.
Following Trounstine (2016), I include district-level estimates of the populations of five racial and
ethnic groups in the index: whites, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and all others.
The data come from 5-years estimates from the American Community Survey, aggregated to state
legislative districts by the private firm Social Explorer. Summary statistics for these data and all
subsequently named variables are provided in Table C.1 of Appendix C.
To test the expectation that diversity is positively associated with more extreme voting records, I
estimate regression models following the form:
Ideal Point Extremity = β0 + β1 · Racial Diversity + Controls + 
A positive coefficent estimate for the variable Racial Diversity will provide evidence supporting this
expectation.
Before testing a full model with controls, I present the bivariate relationship between the diversity
of legislators’ districts and legislators’ ideal points in Figure 4.1. The horizontal axis presents the
26Shor and McCarty (2011) derive a single score for each state legislator over the course of their career. Scores are
scaled using voting information from all legislators serving over nearly a 20-year period. The mean score is derived from
this body of over-time information, meaning the mean score should not be dependent on or skewed towards a party holding
the majority of state legislative seats in a given year.
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Figure 4.1: District Diversity and Roll-Call Voting Records
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racial diversity of each state legislative district, while the vertical axis presents the ideal point of
the legislator representing each district. Circles symbolize Republican legislators and plus signs
symbolize Democratic legislators. I graph a best fit line for the members of each party to demonstrate
that the association between racial diversity and extreme voting is similar for members of both
parties.
The plot shows similar results for members of each party. As racial diversity increases, Republi-
can legislators tend to hold more extreme voting records, as indicated by the positive slope of the best
fit line. Similarly, the negative slope of the best fit line for Democratic legislators demonstrates that
they too tend to hold more extreme partisan voting records as racial diversity in the district increases.
As expected, representatives of more diverse constituencies hold more partisan voting records.
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for the bivariate model confirm a positive and
statistically significant association between racial diversity in the district and the extremity of a
legislator’s voting record (β = 0.38, p = 0.00). They indicate that a one-unit increase in the measure
of racial diversity results in a 0.38-unit increase in the extremity of a voting record. In statistical
terms, this means that moving from the minimum to the maximum possible value of racial diversity
results in an increase of one standard deviation in the dependent variable. In substantive terms,
moving from representing from a racially homogeneous district (for instance, a nearly all-white
district in a rural area) to a racially diverse district (such as one might find in a major city) moves
Republican voting records from the mainstream toward the far right or Democratic voting records
from the mainstream toward the far left.
Figure 4.1 shows that, even in racially homogeneous districts, Republicans and Democrats
are still fairly divided on average. In order to determine more precisely the relationship between
racial diversity and partisanship, I control for several other district-level factors that may incentivize
legislators to adopt more extreme voting records. First, I control for electoral competition in each
legislator’s district. Party leaders may allow legislators representing competitive districts to vote
against the party on some key votes without consequences in order to help them keep their seats.
Over time, legislators representing competitive districts should appear less extreme on average.
One possible way to control for party competition is with district-level presidential vote share
data. However, data for this variable at the state legislative district level are only available for the
2008 election, and estimates are missing for many states. Additionally, single-year presidential vote
share data are subject to short-term electoral forces that may not capture the competitiveness of a
district over time (Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman, 2008). Instead, I control for District Extremity, or
how liberal or conservative a district is, by calculating the distance of each district’s average ideology
from the mean on a unidimensional scale of citizen ideology. As a source of data, I use estimates of
citizen ideology in state legislative districts that Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) obtain through
multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP). Citizen ideology estimated using MRP correlates
strongly with presidential vote share and few districts are missing from the data.27
27As a robustness check I replicate the main results in Table 4.1 below replacing the District Extremity variable with a
Competitiveness variable, which is measured as one minus the difference of Obama and McCain’s vote shares. The results
are presented in Table C.2 of Appendix C. The use of this variable instead of district extremity does not meaningfully
change the estimates for the remaining variables.
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To control for the possibility of asymmetric polarization, such that members of one party hold
more extreme voting records than the other on average, I include a dummy variable for the party of
each legislator. Values of 1 for this variable denote Republican legislators and values of 0 denote
Democrats. Because representatives of multimember districts tend to deviate from the constituency
mean and can win election by cultivating distinct reelection subconstituencies (Shapiro et al., 1990),
I include an indicator variable for Multimember Districts in the model. Many upper chambers of
state legislatures are institutionally modeled after the U.S. Senate, which was designed to serve as
a moderating foil to the U.S. House of Representatives. Because senators and representatives may
systematically differ in their roll-call voting patterns, I add an indicator variable for legislators who
serve in the Upper Chamber of their legislature. Finally, because legislators may take more extreme
positions in more populous districts (Hibbing and Alford, 1990; Gerring et al., 2014), I control for
District Population, measured in hundreds of thousands of districts residents.28
I present the results of the multiple regression analyis including controls in Table 4.1. I report
the results of two reasonable model specifications to demonstrate the robustness of the results. In
Models 1 and 2, I estimate ordinary least squares regression models, given that the dependent variable
is measured as an absolute value and has a lower bound of zero. I include state fixed effects and
report robust clustered standard errors. In Models 3 and 4 I fit a multilevel model with varying
intercepts for states and report bootstrap clustered standard errors.29 Both sets of models give nearly
identical results. I focus on interpreting the results from Models 1 and 2, though the results of Model
1 correspond with those in Model 3 and the results of Model 2 correspond with those in Model 4.
In line with expectations, the coefficient estimate for the principal independent variable, racial
diversity, is positive and statistically significant in Model 1. The results indicate that as the racial
diversity of districts increases, the legislators representing them tend to hold more extreme voting
records, controlling for all other factors in the model. Moving from the minimum (0.01) to maximum
28Though researchers have found that representatives of more ideologically diverse districts vote more on the extremes
(Ensley, 2012; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Gerber and Lewis, 2004), I do not control for ideological diversity for two
reasons. First from a practical standpoint, existing public opinion data are not yet fine-grained enough to allow for the
accurate measurement of variance in public opinion within state legislative districts. Second from an empirical standpoint,
I expect that the inclusion of a control for ideological diversity would not affect estimation of the association between
racial diversity and voting record extremity. Results from Chapter 2 show that racial diversity and ideological diversity
correlate very weakly. Results later in this chapter also indicate that ideological diversity at the state level predicts chamber
polarization independently of racial diversity.
29According to Harden (2011), bootstrap clustered standard errors give better estimates of uncertainty than robust
clustered standard errors in models with relatively small numbers of clusters.
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Table 4.1: District Diversity and Partisanship in Legislative Voting Records
Dependent variable:
Ideal Point Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.34∗ 0.24∗ 0.34∗ 0.24∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
District Extremity 0.80∗ 0.79∗ 0.80∗ 0.79∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Republican 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Multimember District -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Upper Chamber -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
District Population -0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.06
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Racial Diversity X 0.12 0.12
District Population (0.07) (0.08)
State fixed effects Yes Yes No No
State random effects No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.25∗ 0.30∗ 0.50∗ 0.54∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 7,147 7,147 7,147 7,147
Adj. R2 0.33 0.33 – –
BIC 4955.49 4946.63 5224.27 5214.67
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1 and 2 present the
results using OLS regression with state fixed effects and robust clustered standard errors. Models 3 and 4 presents the
results for the same models but using a varying intercepts multilevel model with state random effects and bootstrap
clustered standard errors.
(0.77) observed value of racial diversity results in an approximate shift of Republican legislators
half a standard deviation to the right and of Democratic legislators half a standard deviation to the
left. Turning to the control variables, the coefficient estimate for the district extremity variable is
positively and significantly related to the extremity of legislative voting records. This result provides
evidence that representatives reflect average constituent opinion in their votes, such that Republicans
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vote further to the right when representing more conservative districts and Democrats vote further
to the left when representing more liberal districts. None of the remaining control variables are
significantly related to ideal point extremity.
In Model 2, I include an interaction term for the racial diversity and district population variables.
Results from the previous chapter show that the association between racial diversity and the extremity
of candidate positions is conditional on district populations, such that candidates in diverse, populous
district campaign on the extremes while candidates in diverse, sparsely populated districts do not.
It could be the case that this finding also applies to the voting records of sitting legislators. The
coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positively signed, in line with expectations. However,
the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.
Figure 4.2 present a marginal effects plot of the interaction term. The horizontal axis presents the
district population in hundreds of thousands of voters while the vertical axis presents the marginal
effect of racial diversity on ideal point extremity. The figure shows that the marginal effect of diversity
on extremity is estimated to increase as population increases, but that the confidence intervals are too
wide to reject the null hypothesis. As a result, the possibility that the size of the association between
racial diversity and ideal point extremity remains the same no matter the population of the district
cannot be ruled out. The substantive size and statistical significance of the control variables remain
largely the same in Model 2 as in Model 1.
A potential challenge to the model comes from missing data. A logistic regression analysis of
the missing observations of legislator ideal points (reported in Table C.3 of Appendix C) shows that
Democrats and representatives of less diverse districts are more likely to be missing. I estimated
separate models imputing the missing data. Again, the results do not differ meaningfully from the
results presented in Table 4.1. Full results using imputed data are presented in Table C.4 in Appendix
C.
Overall, the models provide evidence supporting the expectation that representatives of more
diverse districts vote more consistently with their parties. Next I turn to testing whether this partisan
voting behavior translates into greater polarization.
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Figure 4.2: Racial Diversity and District Population
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Polarization in Legislative Chambers
To test the expectation that legislative parties are more polarized in states with more diverse
populations, I gather data for each chamber (except the nonpartisan Nebraska legislature) for the
legislative terms ending in 2010, 2012, and 2014, yielding a total of 294 observations.30 These
terms are chosen because data for both interparty distance and diversity are available for each term.
Summary statistics for these data are provided in Table C.5 in Appendix C.
The measure of polarization I use is interparty distance, a measure of the distance across a
common space between the median legislators in each party. Data for the variable also come from
30In states where legislative terms do not end in even-numbered years, I use data from the most recently concluded term.
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Figure 4.3: Racial Diversity and Party Polarization in State Legislative Chambers
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Shor and McCarty (2011).31 I calculate Racial Diversity in the same way as the district-level models,
but use state-level estimates from the American Community Survey.32
Figure 4.3 plots the bivariate relationship between diversity and polarization in state legislative
chambers. The horizontal axis shows the racial diversity of a state population as measured by the
Herfindahl index, and the vertical axis shows Shor and McCarty’s (2011) measure of interparty
distance, a measure of polarization. In line with expectations, the plot shows that more diverse states
tend to have more polarized legislatures. Bivariate regression results confirm a positive, statistically
significant relationship. The results indicate that a one-unit increase in the value racial diversity
corresponds with a 0.53-unit increase in the value of interparty distance (p = 0.012). In statistical
terms, this means that moving from the minimum to the maximum possible value of racial diversity
results in an increase of one standard deviation in the dependent variable. In substantive terms,
31Shor and McCarty (2011) provide an alternative measure of polarization, calculated as the average distance between
all possible dyads of legislators within a chamber. Employing this measure rather than interparty distance makes few
changes to the results; see Table C.6 in Appendix C.
32An alternative measure of racial diversity would be mean district-level diversity for each state legislative chamber.
However, the correlation between state-level diversity and mean district-level diversity by chamber is r = 0.97. No
meaningful differences in the results occur as a consequence of this choice.
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moving from the minimum to the maximum value of racial diversity would move a chamber with
an average amount of polarization like the 2014 Vermont House (interparty distance = 1.45) to a
chamber with a fairly high amount of polarization like the 2014 Wisconsin House (interparty distance
= 1.95). For context, the Wisconsin House is estimated as the tenth most polarized state house, while
the Vermont House is estimated as the 25th most polarized among the 45 state houses with available
data for the year 2014.
Visual inspection of Figure 4.3 suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in the model, and
a Breusch-Pagan test confirms the visual test (χ2 = 15.35, p = 0.000). To account for it, I
estimate all future models with robust standard errors. Another possible strategy for dealing with
heteroskedasticity is by transforming the dependent variable. I transform the dependent variable by
calculating the log of Interparty Distance. A Breusch-Pagan test confirms heteroskedasticity is less
of a concern using the log-transformed dependent variable (χ2 = 3.60, p = 0.058). I replicate the
results of the regression models below using the log-transformed dependent variable and report them
in Table C.7 in Appendix C.
As further evidence, I fit several regression models controlling for state-level factors that are also
associated with greater polarization. First, I control for the ideological diversity of state populations.
Previous results have shown that ideologically heterogeneous states elect more polarized legislatures
(Kirkland, 2014). I measure ideological diversity using variance in measures of state-level policy
mood originally derived by Carsey and Harden (2010).33 I use 2010 data calculated by Harden
and Carsey (2012) and extend the measure using data from the 2012 and 2014 waves of CCES and
matching values to the appropriate state-year. Relatedly, scholars have criticized demographic indices
measuring diversity for being poor proxies of ideological diversity (Levendusky and Pope, 2010).
However, as chapter 2 of this dissertation argues, racial diversity and and ideological diversity are
empirically and theoretically distinct concepts. The measures of racial diversity and ideological
heterogeneity I use here correlate weakly at r = −0.07.
I further control for two variables meant to capture political competition between the parties
within states, which drive roll-call voting patterns, party positioning on the issues, and polarization
33This measure of state ideology, also used in analyses by Harden and Carsey (2012) and Kirkland (2014) is calculated
by factor analyzing responses to six social policy questions appearing on the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey.
According to Harden and Carsey (2012), this measure may be preferable to measures of state ideology dependent on
citizen self-identification, due to the symbolic nature of ideological labels (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).
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(Hinchcliffe and Lee, 2015). I control for state-level party competition in government using a folded
Ranney index (see Holbrook and La Raja, 2010) and for state-level electoral competition between the
parties using an updated measure of competition originally introduced by Holbrook and Van Dunk
(1993).34 Data for the competition variables come from Klarner (2013).
Finally, I include a set of controls for legislative institutions that structure roll-call voting patterns
and, as a consequence, legislative polarization. I include variables for states that term limit their
legislators and for the average population of constituencies for the chamber. I also include indicator
variables for upper chambers and for chambers in which at least some members are elected from
multimember districts.
I estimate a series of regression models in Table 4.2 to test expectations. Models 1 through 3
are specified using OLS regression and reported with robust standard errors. Model 4 is specified
using multilevel modeling and reported with robust clustered standard errors. Due to missingness on
the dependent variable, only 246 of the total 294 observations are used in these tests. I use multiple
imputation to account for the missing data in a series of models in Table C.8 of Appendix C. Imputing
the missing observations makes no meaningful changes to the results.
Model 1 of the Table 4.2 regresses interparty distance on racial diversity, controlling only for
ideological diversity and the year of observation. The results indicate that racial diversity has a
positive and statistically significant association with interparty distance, with the size of the estimate
increasing slightly from the coefficient estimate in the bivariate regression, once ideological diversity
is taken into account. Ideological diversity also has a positive and statistically significant association
with interparty distance, confirming findings from Kirkland (2014).
Model 2 estimates a similar OLS regression model with the full set of control variables in-
cluded.35 After including controls, the coefficient estimate for the racial diversity variable remains
signed in the expected, positive direction, but decreases in size compared to Model 1 and is not
statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence. The coefficient estimate for ideological diversity
remains virtually unchanged moving from the first to the second model and remains statistically
34Though the measures are related, Flavin (2012) demonstrates that the two variables measure distinct aspects of political
competition.
35Several of the control variables are moderately correlated, introducing concerns of multicollinearity. I calculated the
variance inflation factors (VIF) for all variables in Model 2. However, the VIF values range from 1.05 to 1.69, indicating
multicollinearity is not present in the model.
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Table 4.2: Diversity and Chamber Polarization
Dependent variable:
Interparty Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.66∗ 0.45 0.51∗ 0.90
(0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.52)
Ideological Diversity 2.19∗ 2.20∗ 2.21∗ 0.50∗
(0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.17)
Party Competition 0.30 0.25 0.61
in Government (0.34) (0.35) (0.72)
Electoral Competition 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Upper Chamber -0.18∗ -0.19∗ -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Term Limits 0.04 0.05 0.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
District Population 0.17∗ 0.25∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
Racial Diversity X -0.01
District Population (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Random Effects No No No Yes
Constant -0.92∗ -1.77∗ -1.77∗ -0.59
(0.39) (0.51) (0.51) (0.79)
Observations 246 246 246 246
Adj. R2 0.14 0.43 0.43 –
BIC 357.12 279.41 284.30 -30.30
Note: ∗p<0.05. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1 through 3 present OLS regression models and robust standard
errors. Model 4 presents a multilevel model with state random effects and robust clustered standard errors.
significant. Among the control variables, greater electoral competition between the two major parties
in the state is positively and significantly associated with greater chamber-level polarization. The
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results also demonstrate that upper chambers of state legislatures are less polarized on average than
lower chambers, reiterating the finding from the individual-level analysis that state senators voted less
on the extremes than state representatives. Finally, the coefficient estimate for the district population
variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that in chambers where legislators represent
larger constituencies are more polarized.
The individual-level findings above and the findings of the previous chapter on candidate behavior
suggest that the association between racial diversity and partisanship is conditional on the population
of constituents. In Model 3, I add an interaction term between racial diversity and the district
population variable. Evidence in line with the previous models would come in the form of a positive,
statistically significant coefficient estimate for the interaction term.
Figure 4.4 presents the marginal effects plot from this interaction term. The horizontal axis is the
average constituency population for a legislator in each chamber, and the vertical axis is the marginal
effect of racial diversity on chamber polarization. Contrary to expectations, the estimated marginal
effect of racial diversity is signed in the negative direction. Moreover, the confidence intervals are
wide, prohibiting the possibility of ruling out a null marginal effect. This result indicates that, at the
chamber level, the positive association between racial diversity and polarization is not contingent on
the population of legislators’ constituencies.
A potential shortcoming of the first three models is that they do not account for the clustering
of chambers within states. Model 4 presents the results of a more stringent test, providing the
coefficient estimates from a multilevel model with varying intercepts for states alongside bootstrap-
clustered standard errors. The direction and size of the coefficient estimate for the racial diversity
variable increases compared to previous model, but the increased standard errors do not allow for
the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level of confidence. Among the controls, ideological
diversity continues to positively and significantly predict chamber-level polarization, but the size
of the coefficient estimate decreases substantially compared to the other models. Greater electoral
competition continues to be positively and significantly associated with interparty distance, but the
upper chamber and district population variables are no longer significant in this model.
Though a check of the correlations between the independent and control variables revealed no
multicollinearity, one reason for the mixed results could lie in the moderate correlations between
racial diversity, electoral competition, and district population. To isolate the association between
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Figure 4.4: Racial Diversity and Average District Population
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racial diversity and chamber polarization, I turn to a matching analysis. In Appendix C, I use
coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012) to isolate the effect of racial diversity
on chamber polarization, while matching observations on electoral competition and constituency
population. The results are presented in Table C.9 of that appendix. The analysis indicates that
racial diversity has a positive and statistically significant effect even after matching observations
on confounding variables. Taken together, these models provide suggestive evidence of a positive
relationship between racial diversity and chamber polarization.
Discussion
Constituencies provide varying electoral incentives for legislators to support their party’s agenda
in office. Legislators have incentive to signal partisanship to diverse constituencies to emphasize
common support to the various social groups that form a party coalition. Legislators have less
incentive to signal partisanship in homogeneous districts, where the support of a majority social
group is sufficient to elect a legislator to office.
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This chapter provides evidence that, when representing more diverse constituencies, legislators
choose to vote the party line more often. An analysis of the voting records of more than 7,000
state legislators demonstrates that legislators of both parties hold more extreme voting records when
representing districts that are more racially diverse. The results also provide suggestive, but not
conclusive, evidence that in states where the entire population is more racially diverse, two parties
tend to be more polarized within legislative chambers.
The present research contributes to our understanding of representation and party polarization by
articulating the role of social groups and party coalitions in producing extreme voting records. While
early research considered the effects of district diversity on representation in terms of demographic
factors (Fiorina, 1974; Bond, 1983), it failed to take into account the group cleavages relevant to
party competition (Koetzle, 1998). By restricting the definition of diversity to race, a factor known
to be important in the construction of party coalitions, the present study captures group divisions
relevant to party competition and representation.
This work has several limitations. It is bound in scope to the United States in the years 2010-2014.
Moreover, it only examines the political cleavages surrounding race and ethnicity. Future work
should examine whether the articulated theory applies to other group-based partisan cleavages (for
example, those centered around religion or economic class). A further limitation of this study is
that it only observes sitting legislators, meaning that only the behavior of politicians who won office
(rather than all politicians who competed) is observed here. This study does not take into account
district-level competition or contestation, though evidence from the previous chapter suggests that
diversity also influences candidate positioning. Finally, due to the unavailability of measures of
ideological diversity at the state legislative district level, this chapter cannot claim unconditionally
that racial diversity and ideological diversity independently influence legislators’ voting decisions.
However, the result that racial and ideological diversity independently influence polarization in state
chambers provide some evidence supporting the claim.
An implication of this study concerns the cues that elected officials use to gauge constituency
opinion and make voting decisions. If legislators vote more in line with their party in more diverse
districts, even after taking public opinion into account, then legislators likely use the race and
ethnicity of their constituents to make assumptions about constituents’ partisanship and preferences.
This idea falls in line with previous findings that legislators and their staffs use social groups present
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in their districts as heuristics to determine public support for proposed policy changes (Miler, 2010).
Normatively speaking, such assumptions may pose little problem if members of a particular racial
or ethnic group strongly identify as partisans and generally support the actions of their party in
government. However, such assumptions could become pernicious in cases where issue-specific
opinion among members of a particular group deviates from the party platform.
A second implication of this research is to put qualifications on the argument that the creation of
uncompetitive, homogeneous districts (whether through gerrymandering or sorting) contributes to
polarization. The results from this chapter and the preceding chapter both support the argument that
a lack of competition drives polarization. However, the results suggest that diversity in the district
(positively correlated with, but distinct from, competition) may serve to incentivize politicians to
act as extreme partisans. In contrast, drawing socially homogeneous districts (as many states do by
preserving communities of interest) may incentivize politicians to focus on providing constituency
representation.
A final implication of this research is to challenge the popular view that increasing racial diversity
as result of demographic change will pressure the Republican Party to moderate in order to appeal
to voters outside its traditional base of conservative, predominantly white citizens. In contrast,
this chapter suggests that increasing racial diversity will carry the consequence of increased party
polarization in governing institutions. This implication complements behavioral research showing a
strong trend of white voters towards supporting the Republican Party in recent years (Hajnal and
Rivera, 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). It also helps to explain the suprise victory of Donald
Trump, who was widely criticized for racially insensitive campaign language, in the 2016 presidential
election. However, polarization will only continue to intensify if the two parties choose to maintain
their current electoral coalitions along racial and ethnic group lines. History shows that the parties
will change positions to attract new sets of voters when an electoral coalition fails to be viable (Miller
and Schofield, 2003; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). In recent elections, the parties have made few
efforts to change stances on racial issues. The maintenance of contemporary coalitions bodes poorly
for less polarized government.
89
CHAPTER 5: REPRESENTING A DIVERSE NATION
Partisan extremism and polarization among elected officials fall among the chief concerns about
American politics in the early 21st Century. Scholars and pundits cite government gridlock and
policy unreflective of public opinion or unresponsive to public needs as negative consequences
of polarization (Mann and Ornstein, 2012). This dissertation seeks to clarify the role of political
divisions in the electorate in influencing or rewarding polarization among lawmakers.
Though changes in political activism and government institutions are at least partly to blame
for polarization, another part of the explanation lies with voters themselves (Theriault, 2008). Most
often, scholars and activists blame the political homogenization of electorates, through processes of
gerrymandering or sorting, for creating safe elections to protect extreme incumbents (Bishop, 2008;
Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003; Carson et al., 2007). Others suggest instead that diversity in
electorates may incentivize more extreme partisan behavior (Fiorina, 1974; Bailey and Brady, 1998;
Gerber and Lewis, 2004; Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Harden and Carsey, 2012; Kirkland, 2014).
When electorates are more ideologically diverse, these studies argue, lawmakers have less incentive
to position themselves to appeal to the average voter and more incentive to mobilize ideological
factions to turn out on Election Day.
This dissertation builds upon these studies of ideological diversity, but identifies another factor
that divides electorates and incentivizes partisan legislative behavior: group diversity. With some
variation, elections in the U.S. are generally contested by two candidates, one from each major party.
District diversity matters to candidates and lawmakers to the extent that it divides votes for one
party’s candidate or the other. Ideological diversity in the district produces such divisions, but many
voters who identify with one party or another do not hold constrained ideological beliefs (Converse,
1964; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Achen and Bartels, 2016; Campbell et al., 1960). Party candidates
also win votes from members of social groups that unite to form party coalitions (Bawn et al., 2012;
Axelrod, 1972; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi, 1986; Brooks
and Manza, 1997; Karol, 2009). Diversity in the constituency in terms of party-aligned social groups
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also induces candidates and lawmakers to position themselves as extreme partisans in order to unite
and mobilize base voters.
For evidence, the dissertation draws upon a variety of data describing the ideological and racial
diversity of state populations and the partisanship of state-level lawmakers. Chapter 2 explains
why some state populations are more ideologically diverse than others. Departing from previous
explanations that more demographically diverse populations are more ideologically diverse (e.g.
Sullivan, 1973; Levendusky and Pope, 2010), the chapter provides evidence that ideological diversity
in state populations hinges on social context and education levels. Importantly, the chapter estab-
lishes that ideological diversity and racial diversity are theoretically distinct concepts that produce
empirically distinct measures. Chapter 3 examines differences in partisanship among candidates
for state legislature. Text analysis of the websites of 2016 state senate candidates and a survey
of a representative sample of 2016 state legislative candidates produces evidence that candidates
emphasize their partisanship more when campaigning in diverse districts than in homogeneous
districts. Chapter 4 extends the analysis to the voting behavior of elected state legislators, finding
that legislators representing more diverse districts also hold more partisan voting records. In the
aggregate, this pattern manifests itself in greater party polarization in state legislatures governing
more diverse state populations.
This research provides several contributions to the literatures on representation, campaigns and
elections, and party polarization. First, the dissertation provides a previously missing theoretical
explanation of why some electorates are more ideologically diverse than others. The finding that
ideological diversity hinges on education levels and population density, and not demographic di-
versity, allows for a theoretical distinction between ideological diversity and group diversity. This
distinction was previously obscured by debates about whether demographics adequately proxied
for ideological diversity (Levendusky and Pope, 2010; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2006; Gerber and
Lewis, 2004). These particular results also point to increasing education levels in the public as a
source of polarization in the electorate and encourages further research on the subject.
Second, the dissertation demonstrates that candidates and lawmakers position themselves based
on both ideological diversity and racial diversity in their districts. Previous research had only
identified ideological diversity as a contributor to extreme partisanship among elected officials and
polarization between parties. The findings complement arguments by Grossmann and Hopkins
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(2016) that parties position themselves on the basis of both ideology and social group coalitions.
Interestingly, however, the results presented here contradict their claim that Democrats respond more
to group pressures while Republicans respond more to ideological pressures. Analysis of individual
legislators’ voting records showed that both Democrats and Republicans representing racially diverse
districts held more partisan voting records. Future research might reconcile these discordant results
through a further examination of how politicians position themselves not only in response to the
electoral demands of supporting voters, but also to the demands of opposing voters.
Third, the dissertation implicates demographic changes in the United States since the 1960s as a
contributing factor to the contemporary party polarization. The mass entry of African Americans into
the voting public in the wake of the Civil Rights movement, as well as waves of immigrants from
Asia and Latin America in the following decades, have greatly diversified the voting public. Whereas
whites comprised more than 90% of the voting public in the middle of the 20th Century, they now
comprise closer to 2/3 of voters (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015).
Demographic changes alone are not sufficient to cause polarization. Rather, the politicization of
issues of race and ethnicity by the parties for electoral advantage, in combination with demographic
changes, are responsible. The politicization of issues of race for partisan advantage in the U.S. dates
back at least to Martin Van Buren’s formation of the Democratic Party with a coalition of New York
merchants and Southern slaveholders (Cohen et al., 2008). Likewise, Richard Nixon’s Southern
Strategy realigned white southerners with the Republican Party in the 1960s and 1970s (Olson, 2008).
Over the last five decades, political conflicts over issues of race have extended into broader partisan
conflicts (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Layman and Carsey, 2002). The present findings suggest that
polarization will continue to increase as the nation continues to grow more racially and ethnically
diverse. However, the continuation of this trend is predicated on the assumption that the two parties
will maintain racialized coalitions of support. A detente between Democrats and Republicans on
issues of race, perhaps prompted by these same demographic changes, could alleviate the problem.
Though this dissertation focuses on racial diversity as a salient example of how group diversity
prompts extremism among politicians, future research might examine other types of group diversity.
Other social group divisions that correspond with partisan divisions, such as religious groups or
economic groups, might also prompt extremity in elite political behavior. Previous research supports
the idea. Neiheisel and Djupe (2017) find, for instance, that U.S. Senators who represented more
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religiously diverse states shifted to the ideological extremes after the introduction of direct elections
in 1912. Cross-national research on this subject would also allow researchers to study a wider
variation in the types of group diversity that prompt party cleavages and extremity.
Normatively, the findings imply disparities in the responsiveness of elected officials to white
and minority voters. The research suggests that more extreme partisans represent voters living
in racially diverse districts. More constituency-focused legislators, in contrast, represent racially
homogeneous districts. However, homogeneously white districts vastly outnumber homogeneous
minority districts in the U.S., a fact supported by the American Community Survey data used in this
analysis. As a result, white voters are more likely represented by legislators focused on addressing
constituency needs than scoring partisan political victories. A policy solution to this disparty would
be the creation and maintenance of majority-minority districts. Research on race and redistricting
shows that the creation of majority-black districts in the 1980s and 1990s allowed for the election of
black representatives who specifically advocated policies favored by black voters, even when those
policies conflicted with the stances of the Democratic Party (Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Grose 2011,
though see Swain 1993).
The findings also reinforce concerns that social diversity poses a challenge to democratic
governance. When more voters share common identities, values, and life experiences, politicians
have greater electoral incentives to espouse the views of the majority. However, greater consensus in
the population might also lead to a “tyranny of the majority,” as James Madison wrote in Federalist
10. When voters are more diverse, politicians have less incentive to respond to majorities and more
incentive to mobilize factions. However, Madison also feared “the mischiefs of factions” would lead
to the downfall of democratic governments. The challenge for elected officials in representing diverse
populations is to find common ground between factions where it exists and compromise where it
does not.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1: Question Wording on Ideological Extremity Scales
Issue CCES 2010 ANES 2012
Abortion Which one of the opinions on this
page best agrees with your view on
abortion?
By law abortion should never be
permitted.
The law should permit abortion only in
case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s
life is in danger.
The law should permit abortion for
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger
to the woman’s life, but only after the
need for the abortion has been clearly
established.
By law, a woman should always be able
to obtain an abortion as a matter of
personal choice.
There has been some discussion
about abortion during recent years.
Which one of the opinions on this
page best agrees with your view?
By law abortion should never be
permitted.
The law should permit abortion only in
case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s
life is in danger.
The law should permit abortion for
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger
to the woman.
By law, a woman should always be able
to obtain an abortion as a matter of
personal choice.
Affirmative Action Affirmative action programs give
preference to racial minorities in
employment and college admission
in order to correct for past discrim-
ination. Do you support or oppose
affirmative action?
[4-point scale]
Do you favor, oppose or neither favor
nor oppose allowing companies to
increase the number of black workers
by considering race along with other
factors when choosing employees?
[7-point scale]
Healthcare Reform Congress considered many important
bills over the past two years. for each
of the following tell us whether you
support or oppose the legislation in
principle. Comprehensive Health
Reform Act. Requires all Americans
to obtain health insurance. Allows
people to keep current provider. Sets
up health insurance option for thoe
without coverage. Increase taxes on
those making more than $280,000 a
year.
Support
Oppose
Do you favor, oppose, or neither
favor nor oppose the health care
reform law passed in 2010? This
law requires all Americans to buy
health insurance and requires health
insurance companies to accept
everyone?
[7-point scale]
Continued on next page
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Issue CCES 2010 ANES 2012
Environment Some people think it is important
to protect the environment even if it
costs some jobs or otherwise reduces
our standard of living. Other people
think that protecting the environment
is not as important as maintaining
jobs and our standard of living.
Which is closer to the way you feel,
or haven’t you thought much about
this?
Much more important to protect
environment even if we lose jobs and
have a lower standard of living.
Environment somewhat more important.
About the same.
Economy somewhat more important.
Much more important to protect jobs
even if environment worse.
Where would you place yourself on
this scale, or haven’t you thought
much about this?
7-point scale ranging from:
“Regulate business to protect the environ-
ment and create jobs.” to
“No regulation because it will not work
and will cost jobs.”
Stem Cell Research Congress considered many important
bills over the past two years. for each
of the following tell us whether you
support or oppose the legislation
in principle. Embryonic Stem Cell
Research. Allow federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research.
Support
Oppose
N/A
Gay Adoption N/A Do you think gay or lesbian couples
should be legally permitted to adopt
children?
Yes
No
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 2.1
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
CCES (N = 53,728)
Ideological Extremity Absolute value of ideology score 0.88 0.00 1.77 0.48
Education Ordinal scale of education level 3.83 0 4 1.40
College Indicator: college graduate = 1, else = 0 0.42 0 1 −
Interest Ordinal scale of interest in politics 3.45 0 4 0.93
Male Indicator: male = 1, female = 1 0.49 0 1 −
Age Age of respondent (in tens) 5.27 1.8 9.1 1.47
Democrat Indicator: Democrat = 1, else = 0 0.44 0 1 −
Republican Indicator: Republican = 1, else = 0 0.43 0 1 −
ANES (N = 4645)
Ideological Extremity Absolute value of ideology score 0.82 0.00 2.34 0.57
Education Ordinal scale of education level 1.98 0 4 1.16
College Indicator: college graduate = 1, else = 0 0.31 0 1 −
Interest Ordinal scale of interest in politics 2.37 0 4 1.12
Knowledge Factor score of knowledge items 0.00 -2.98 1.38 1.00
Male Indicator: male = 1, female = 1 0.48 0 1 −
Age Age of respondent (in tens) 4.96 1.7 0.9 1.67
Democrat Indicator: Democrat = 1, else = 0 0.41 0 1 −
Republican Indicator: Republican = 1, else = 0 0.24 0 1 −
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Table A.3: Education Levels and Ideological Extremity
Dependent variable: Ideological Extremity
(CCES 2010) (ANES 2012)
HS Diploma 0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Some College 0.04∗ 0.05
(0.01) (0.03)
College 0.08∗ 0.09∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Advanced Degree 0.12∗ 0.13∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Interest 0.11∗ 0.10∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Knowledge 0.06∗
(0.01)
Male 0.02∗ -0.01
(0.00) (0.02)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Democrat 0.15∗ 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Republican 0.15∗ 0.21∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Constant 0.26∗ 0.39∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Observations 53,728 4645
Adj. R2 0.09 0.11
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Data for model 1 come
from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Data for model 2 come from the 2012 American National
Election Study.
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Table A.4: Values of Ideological Diversity by State
State Avg. 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 St. Dev.
Oregon 1.178 1.107 1.263 1.170 1.172 1.181 0.056
Alaska 1.152 1.094 1.132 1.208 1.070 1.255 0.078
New Mexico 1.100 1.038 1.074 1.088 1.144 1.156 0.049
Washington 1.098 1.056 1.112 1.139 1.095 1.087 0.031
Colorado 1.074 1.030 1.095 1.080 1.090 1.073 0.026
Arizona 1.066 1.029 1.104 1.061 1.072 1.062 0.027
Montana 1.066 1.135 0.967 1.093 1.043 1.090 0.064
Minnesota 1.060 1.059 1.061 1.065 1.119 0.993 0.045
Wyoming 1.054 1.090 1.034 1.084 1.038 1.026 0.030
Missouri 1.034 1.029 1.053 1.085 1.008 0.995 0.036
Iowa 1.033 1.020 1.070 1.080 0.969 1.025 0.044
Wisconsin 1.029 0.998 1.076 1.035 1.030 1.009 0.030
Texas 1.022 1.047 1.021 0.981 1.025 1.034 0.025
California 1.020 1.081 1.060 0.985 1.010 0.965 0.049
Virginia 1.020 1.005 0.992 1.059 1.018 1.026 0.025
North Carolina 1.018 1.012 1.057 1.000 0.982 1.037 0.029
Oklahoma 1.010 0.871 1.072 1.006 1.025 1.075 0.083
Tennessee 1.000 0.984 1.024 0.993 0.970 1.030 0.026
Kansas 0.995 0.896 0.979 1.004 0.956 1.140 0.090
Idaho 0.989 0.924 1.178 0.857 0.976 1.008 0.12
Nebraska 0.981 0.911 1.099 0.793 1.022 1.079 0.128
Arkansas 0.971 0.986 0.975 0.972 0.942 0.980 0.017
Kentucky 0.967 1.037 0.938 0.968 0.913 0.980 0.047
South Carolina 0.964 0.946 0.894 0.969 0.994 1.015 0.047
Michigan 0.962 0.922 1.051 0.970 0.933 0.934 0.053
Louisiana 0.962 0.895 1.003 0.990 0.970 0.951 0.042
Georgia 0.961 0.963 0.971 0.942 0.915 1.017 0.038
South Dakota 0.960 0.764 0.893 0.982 1.039 1.123 0.138
Maine 0.959 1.082 0.853 0.950 0.937 0.973 0.082
Utah 0.956 0.803 1.014 0.960 0.968 1.035 0.091
Ohio 0.956 0.975 0.946 0.976 0.950 0.932 0.019
Mississippi 0.956 0.914 0.954 0.946 0.978 0.986 0.029
Indiana 0.955 0.929 0.932 0.968 0.977 0.968 0.023
North Dakota 0.949 0.848 0.926 0.905 1.033 1.031 0.081
Vermont 0.947 0.748 0.997 0.909 1.015 1.065 0.125
Florida 0.937 0.949 0.933 0.934 0.928 0.943 0.008
Pennsylvania 0.931 0.954 0.890 0.964 0.959 0.887 0.039
Illinois 0.929 0.919 0.926 0.936 0.915 0.948 0.013
Alabama 0.925 0.910 0.914 0.858 0.925 1.019 0.058
Delaware 0.919 0.794 0.900 1.059 0.876 0.969 0.100
New Hampshire 0.919 0.961 0.882 0.961 0.912 0.879 0.040
Hawaii 0.910 0.930 0.904 0.954 0.868 0.895 0.033
Nevada 0.907 0.856 0.887 0.911 0.952 0.929 0.037
West Virginia 0.899 0.858 0.800 0.927 1.022 0.887 0.083
Connecticut 0.881 0.864 0.947 0.912 0.853 0.829 0.048
Maryland 0.880 0.802 0.833 0.936 0.893 0.936 0.061
Massachusetts 0.876 0.860 0.918 0.941 0.809 0.853 0.053
New Jersey 0.872 0.943 0.808 0.928 0.860 0.820 0.061
New York 0.866 0.919 0.794 0.904 0.884 0.828 0.053
Rhode Island 0.788 0.750 0.715 0.791 0.813 0.872 0.060
Data from the 2006-2014 waves of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Values represent the
variance in individual factor scores capturing latent left-right ideology within state populations. Survey items
used to produce the factor scores are presented in appendix Table A1.
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Table A.5: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 2.2
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Ideological Diversity Variance in citizen ideology 0.98 0.71 1.26 0.09
Urban Pct. urban population 0.74 0.39 0.95 0.14
College % state pop. with 4-year degree 0.28 0.17 0.40 0.05
Racial Diversity Herfindahl index 0.41 0.09 0.80 0.16
Economic Diversity Gini coefficient 0.45 0.40 0.51 0.02
Population Millions of state residents 6.11 0.52 38.07 6.75
Party Competition Folded Ranney index 0.88 0.68 1.00 0.08
in Government
Electoral Competition Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure 38.89 16.19 61.57 11.10
Citizen Ideology Carsey and Harden’s measure -0.04 -0.47 0.54 0.18
Northeast Indicator for 11 NE states 0.22 0 1 −
West Indicator for 13 Western states 0.26 0 1 −
N = 250
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Table A.6: Racial Diversity, Economic Diversity, and Ideological Diversity
Dependent variable:
Ideological Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
Racial Diversity -0.01 0.06
(0.06) (0.08)
Economic Diversity -1.13∗ -1.33
(0.51) (0.68)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.95∗ 1.45∗ 1.52∗
(0.03) (0.23) (0.28)
Observations 250 250 250
Adj. R2 0.00 0.06 0.07
Note: ∗p<0.05. Bootstrap clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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Table A.7: Urbanization, Education and Ideological Diversity Using Levendusky and Pope’s Measure
Dependent variable:
Ideological Diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.22
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Urban2 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.17
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
College 0.09∗ 0.05 0.07 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Racial Diversity -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Economic Diversity 0.22 0.04
(0.14) (0.14)
Population (in millions) 0.00∗
(0.00)
Party Competition 0.06∗
in Government (0.02)
Electoral Competition -0.00
(0.00)
Citizen Ideology 0.02
(0.02)
Northeast 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
West 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.11∗ 0.06 0.11∗ 0.06 -0.05 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 49
Adj. R2 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.21 0.40
Note: ∗p<0.05. Classic standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Nebraska is excluded from
Model 6 because party competition in government cannot be measured in its nonpartisan legislature.
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Table A.8: Urbanization, Education and Ideological Diversity Using Alternative Measures of Educa-
tion Levels
Dependent variable:
Ideological Diversity
(1) (2) (3)
Urban 1.24 1.25 1.29
(0.79) (0.75) (0.75)
Urban2 -1.06 -1.08∗ -1.10∗
(0.56) (0.23) (0.53)
HS Diploma 0.64
(0.41)
College 0.54∗
(0.23)
Advanced Degree 0.98∗
(0.49)
Racial Diversity 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Economic Diversity 0.31 -0.16 -0.29
(0.63) (0.57) (0.55)
Population (in millions) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Party Competition 0.15 0.16 0.14
in Government (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Electoral Competition -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Northeast -0.05∗ -0.07∗ -0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
West 0.10∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.23 0.40 0.49
(0.56) (0.42) (0.41)
Observations 245 245 245
Adj. R2 0.47 0.48 0.47
Note: ∗p<0.05. Bootstrap clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Five
observations of Nebraska are excluded because party competition in government cannot be measured in its nonpartisan
legislature.
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Extremity or Consistency?
Broockman (2016) shows that more extreme values of ideology derived using conventional latent
variable analyses of survey data, such as this one, tend to reflect responses that consistently fall in
line with a liberal or a conservative ideology, but that these positions cannot be used to infer that
the individual holds extreme preferences on any single issue. For example, an individual could hold
moderately liberal positions on a number of issues and be estimated as an extreme liberal on the
scale without holding an extreme liberal preference on any single issue. It is also possible that an
individual can hold extreme issue preferences on a number of issues, but can appear as a moderate in
a data set if those extreme issue positions are balanced between liberal and conservative views.
However, ideological extremity is not equivalent to ideological consistency. Individuals who hold
consistently moderate views across many issues are not ideologically extreme but are ideologically
consistent. Ideological extremity specifically describes individuals with ideologically consistent
positions at the ends of the ideological spectrum, or those who hold either constrained liberal views
or constrained conservative views.
To illustrate this point, I create a simple additive index of the same survey item responses used
above, then calculated the variance for each respondent’s answers on that index to create a measure of
Response Heterogeneity. Because all survey items are ordered such that high-value responses on the
scale correspond with liberal issue positions and low-value responses correspond conservative issue
positions, higher values on this variable should indicate a set of higher variance (and consequentially
less ideologically consistent) issue positions. I then regress this response heterogeneity variable on
the ideological extremity variable.
Figure A.1 provides displays the results using data from both the 2012 ANES and 2010 CCES.
The horizontal axis represents the ideological extremity variable derived from factor analysis, while
the vertical axis displays the response heterogeneity variable. The scales on the vertical axis differ in
value between surveys because the ANES tends to provide 7-point scales for item responses while the
CCES tends to provide 4-point scales, which provides different ranges of values for the additive index
from each survey. Note that in both data sets, high values of ideological extremity are associated
with low values of response heterogeneity, indicating that ideologically extreme individuals answer
provide responses to survey items that fall consistently on one side of the ideological spectrum.
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Figure A.1: Ideological Extremity and Ideological Consistency
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However, low values of ideological extremity are associated with both high and low values of
response heterogeneity, as indicated by the fairly even spread of data along the vertical axis on the
left side of the figure. This provides evidence that my measure of ideological extremity captures
individuals who both provide consistent responses and provide responses in line with either a liberal
or a conservative (but not a moderate) ideology.
This distinction between ideological extremity and ideological consistency matters if it is the
case that higher education levels are associated with greater ideological consistency generally, not just
greater ideological extremity as the evidence in Figure 2.3 demonstrates. Under this scenario, higher
education levels would also predict consistently moderate views. However, my individual-level
analysis would not speak to this possibility because my measure of ideological extremity conflates
consistent moderates and respondents with inconsistent views (Broockman, 2016). In the aggregate
tests later, this possibility would actually pose a hard test of the hypothesis that higher education
levels are associated with greater ideological diversity, because higher education levels would be
associated with both diversity-increasing respondents (extreme ideologues) and diversity-decreasing
respondents (moderates). However, it is instructive to know whether this is the case or not using the
individual-level data.
As a test, I analyze the relationship between education levels and ideological consistency among
individuals who scored in the bottom quartile of my ideological extremity variable. I investigate only
this range of respondents because they comprise the subset of respondents with either consistently
moderate or inconsistent views that my measure of ideological extremity conflates. I again employ
the response heterogeneity variable (the same measure used in Figure A.1 to measure ideological
consistency. Unlike the ideological extremity variable, the response heterogeneity measure is able to
distinguish between consistent moderates and inconsistent respondents. If higher education levels
indeed predict ideological consistency among moderates, we should observe decreasing mean values
of response heterogeneity as education levels increase.
Figure A.2 plots the relationship between education levels and ideological consistency. The
horizontal axis for each survey presents the level of education and the vertical axis presents the
mean response heterogeneity for all respondents within each education level category. In the left
panel, the CCES data provides no evidence of a relationship between response heterogeneity and
education. The mean response heterogeneity remains fairly flat across all levels of education. In the
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Figure A.2: Ideological Consistency by Education Level among Moderates
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right panel, the ANES data tell a slightly different story. Here, the general trend in results seems to
indicate that as education levels increase, response heterogeneity seems to decrease. However, the
results do not fall perfectly in line with expectations. Decreases are uneven and even increase moving
from four-year degree holders to graduate and professional degree holders. While the ANES results
provide suggestive evidence that education levels are positively related to ideological consistency, the
CCES results provide no evidence to that effect. I can draw no firm conclusions that higher education
levels are associated with greater ideological consistency among moderates. However, to reiterate
a point made above, such a finding would provide for a harder test of the third hypothesis in the
aggregate-level findings.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 3.1
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Position Extremity Dependent variable 0.81 0.00 3.30 0.57
Racial Diversity Herfindahl index 0.36 0.04 0.76 0.18
District Extremity Absolute value of district opinion 0.25 0.00 1.12 0.20
Republican 1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat 0.50 0 1 −
Two-Party Contest 1 = two partisan opponents, 0 = else 0.75 0 1 −
Multimember District 1 = MMD, 0 = Single Member District 0.02 0 1 −
District Population Avg. district population in state (in 100,000s) 1.72 0.14 9.71 1.87
N = 1180
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Table B.2: District Diversity and Candidate Positioning
Dependent variable:
Position Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity -0.02 -0.04 -0.24 -0.28∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Competitive District -0.12∗ -0.12∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Winner 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Loser 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Two-Party Contest -0.06 -0.11∗ -0.07 -0.12∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
District Extremity 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Republican 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Multimember District -0.15 -0.15 -0.19 -0.20
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
District Population 0.03∗ 0.02∗ -0.06 -0.08∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Racial Diversity X 0.16∗ 0.19∗
District Population (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.86∗ 0.80∗ 0.98∗ 0.93∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 1180 1180 1180 1180
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. I use
multiple imputation to account for 41 missing observations of Florida candidates.
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Table B.3: Multilevel Model of District Diversity and Candidate Positioning
Dependent variable:
Position Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.02 0.02 -0.18 -0.18
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15)
Competitive District -0.11∗ -0.11∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Winner 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Likely Loser 0.20∗ 0.20∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Two-Party Contest -0.10∗ -0.13∗ -0.10∗ -0.14∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
District Extremity 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Republican -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Multimember District -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
District Population 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Racial Diversity X 0.14∗ 0.14∗
District Population (0.07) (0.07)
State Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.89∗ 0.81∗ 0.99∗ 0.91∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 1139 1139 1139 1139
BIC 1914.46 1916.27 1917.63 1919.38
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 3.2
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Party Prioritization Dependent variable 2.15 1 5 0.95
Racial Diversity Herfindahl index 0.34 0.03 0.74 0.18
District Extremity Absolute value of district opinion 0.25 0.00 1.27 0.20
Republican 1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat 0.50 0 1 −
Contested 1 = at least two candidates running, 0 = else 0.82 0 1 −
Two-Party Contest 1 = two partisan opponents, 0 = else 0.77 0 1 −
Multimember District 1 = MMD, 0 = Single Member District 0.15 0 1 −
Upper Chamber 1 = Senate candidate, 0 = House candidate 0.22 0 1 −
District Population Avg. district population in state (in 100,000s) 0.73 0.04 9.53 0.93
Incumbent 1 = respondent is incumbent, 0 = else 0.37 0 1 −
N = 813
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Table B.5: Ordered Logistic Regression of Self-Reported Candidate Partisanship
Dependent variable:
Partisanship
(1) (2)
Diversity 0.67 0.67
(0.37) (0.37)
Contested 0.20
(0.18)
Two-Party Contest 0.15
(0.17)
District Extremity 0.35 0.37
(0.32) (0.32)
Republican -0.41∗ -0.41∗
(0.14) (0.14)
Multimember District 0.36∗ 0.37∗
(0.17) (0.17)
Upper Chamber 0.12 0.12
(0.16) (0.16)
District Population -0.08 -0.07
(0.07) (0.07)
Incumbent 0.25 0.24
(0.15) (0.15)
Observations 813 813
BIC 2158.70 2159.10
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Data
come from the 2016 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al., 2016).
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Matching Analysis
In coarsened exact matching (CEM), covariates are coarsened, or reduced to a small range of
values based on user-defined thresholds (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). All covariates are coarsened,
then combined to create bins where all observations in the same bin share the same values across the
entire set of coarsened covariates. Weighting subsequent analysis based on matched data allow users
to derive robust estimates of the causal effects of a treatment variable on a dependent variable.
CEM is usually used to allow researchers to calculate the effects of binary treatment variables.
However, according to Blackwell et al. (2009), CEM can also be used to isolate the effects of
continuous treatment variables. In these cases, observations are matched on coarsened covariates,
but dummy variables indicating the bins, or blocks, into which each observation falls are used as the
control variables. This model design is equivalent to that in a randomized block experiment, in which
similar observations are matched within subgroups so that researchers can estimate treatment effects
by leveraging variance across subgroups (Imai, King, and Stuart, 2008; Imai, King, and Nall, 2009).
For the purposes of this paper, I conducted two matching analyses to isolate the direct and
conditional effects of racial diversity on candidate position extremity. In the first analysis, I estimate
the direct effects of racial diversity on position extremity. In the second analysis, I estimate the
conditional effects of racial diversity and district population on position extremity. Table B.6 presents
the covariates on which observations are matched and the thresholds defined to create the subgroups
for each analysis.
Table B.7 presents the results of OLS regression including fixed effects for each block created
through CEM. Model 1 presents the results for the direct effects of racial diversity. The resulting
coefficient estimate for the racial diversity variable is positive, in line with expectations. However,
the effect size is substantively small and is not statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.
Model 2 presents the results for the conditional effects. Here, the coefficient estimate for the
interaction between racial diversity and district population is positively and statistically significant at
the .05 level of confidence. As district population increases, the size of the positive effect of diversity
on candidate position extremity increases.
Figure B.1 plots the marginal effect of diversity on candidate position extremity as district
population increases. As in Figure 3.3, the marginal effect of diversity is positive. When district
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population is at its minimum value (about 14,000 voters), diversity has a negative and statistically
significante effect on candidate extremity. However, as district population reaches its maximum value
(nearly 1 million voters), diversity has a positive, statistically significant, and substantively large
effect on candidate extremity. These results provide additional evidence in support of a conditional
effect of diversity candidate extremity.
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Table B.6: Covariates Used for Coarsened Exact Matching
Variable Name Coarsening Thresholds
Competitive District Already binary
Republican Already binary
Two-Party Contest Already binary
Multimember District Already binary
Number of Blocks Created: 16
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Table B.7: Matching Analysis of the Effect of Racial Diversity on Candidate Position Extremity
Dependent variable:
Position Extremity
(1) (2)
Racial Diversity -0.01 -0.32∗
(0.10) (0.13)
District Population -0.07∗
(0.03)
Racial Diversity X 0.17∗
District Population (0.06)
Block 2 0.36 0.39
(0.63) (0.62)
Block 3 0.97 0.97
(0.59) (0.59)
Block 4 0.92 0.93
(0.56) (0.56)
Block 5 0.77 0.74
(0.65) (0.64)
Block 6 0.64 0.67
(0.56) (0.56)
Block 7 0.60 0.63
(0.57) (0.57)
Block 8 0.63 0.67
(0.57) (0.56)
Block 9 0.77 0.77
(0.58) (0.58)
Block 10 1.03 1.02
(0.58) (0.58)
Block 11 0.69 0.71
(0.56) (0.56)
Block 12 0.43 0.42
(0.58) (0.58)
Block 13 0.70 0.72
(0.56) (0.56)
Block 14 0.63 0.60
(0.60) (0.59)
Block 15 0.54 0.56
(0.56) (0.56)
Block 16 0.62 0.64
(0.56) (0.56)
Constant 0.16 0.24
(0.56) (0.56)
Observations 1180 1180
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Block
1 is omitted as the reference category.
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Figure B.1: Conditional Effects of Diversity and Population on Candidate Positioning from Matching
Analysis
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4
Table C.1: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 4.1
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Ideal Point Extremity Absolute value of ideal point 0.80 0 2.72 0.42
Racial Diversity Herfindahl index 0.33 0.01 0.77 0.19
Party 1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat 0.45 0 1 −
District Extremity Absolute value of district opinion 0.22 0.00 1.21 0.17
Upper Chamber 1 = Upper Chamber, 0 = Lower Chamber 0.44 0 1 −
Multimember District 1 = MMD, 0 = Single Member District 0.15 0 1 −
District Population Avg. district population in state (in 100,000s) 0.88 0.03 11.70 1.12
N = 7196
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Table C.2: District Diversity and Partisanship in Legislative Voting Records Controlling for Competi-
tiveness
Dependent variable:
Ideal Point Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.29∗ 0.17∗ 0.29∗ 0.17∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Competitiveness -1.40∗ -1.38∗ -1.39∗ -1.38∗
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Republican 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Multimember District -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Upper Chamber -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
District Population 0.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.07
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Racial Diversity X 0.14 0.14
District Population (0.08) (0.07)
State fixed effects Yes Yes No No
State random effects No No Yes Yes
Constant 1.56∗ 1.60∗ 1.85∗ 1.89∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 7,147 7,147 7,147 7,147
Note: ∗p<0.05. Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1
and 2 present the results using ordinary least squares regression. Models 3 and 4 presents the results for the same models
but using multilevel modelling with state random effects.
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Table C.3: Predictors of Missing Observations of Legislator Extremity
Dependent variable:
Missing
Racial Diversity -1.39∗
(0.55)
District Extremity 0.23
(0.57)
Republican -0.72∗
(0.21)
Multimember District -2.79∗
(0.72)
Upper Chamber -0.98∗
(0.34)
District Population -1.09∗
(0.30)
Constant -2.50∗
(0.23)
Observations 7,265
BIC 1163.43
Note: ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Estimates calculated using
logistic regression.
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Table C.4: District Diversity and Partisanship in Legislative Voting Records with Missing Observa-
tions Imputed
Dependent variable:
Ideal Point Extremity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.34∗ 0.24∗ 0.34∗ 0.23∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
District Extremity 0.80∗ 0.79∗ 0.80∗ 0.79∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Republican 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Multimember District -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Upper Chamber -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
District Population -0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.06
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Racial Diversity X 0.12 0.12
District Population (0.07) (0.06)
State fixed effects Yes Yes No No
State random effects No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.25∗ 0.30∗ 0.50∗ 0.54∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 7,265 7,265 7,265 7,265
Note: ∗p<0.05. Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1
and 2 present the results using ordinary least squares regression. Models 3 and 4 presents the results for the same models
but using multilevel modelling with state random effects.
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Table C.5: Summary Statistics for Data in Table 4.2
Variable Name Description Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Interparty Distance Dependent variable 1.57 0.53 3.17 0.51
Racial Diversity Herfindahl index 0.42 0.10 0.72 0.16
Ideological Variance of Carsey and Harden’s state-level 0.99 0.79 1.25 0.08
Diversity mood measure
Party Competition in Folded Ranney index 0.88 0.72 1.00 0.08
State Government
Electoral Competition Holbrook and Van Dunk’s competition measure 39.04 16.19 61.58 11.26
Upper Chamber 1 = Upper Chamber, 0 = Lower Chamber 0.50 0 1 −
Term Limits 1 = Term Limits, 0 = No Limits 0.29 0 1 −
District Population Avg. district population in state (in 100,000s) 1.08 0.03 9.52 1.42
N = 294
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Table C.6: Diversity and Chamber Polarization Using an Alternative DV
Dependent variable:
Avg. Intermember Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.44∗ 0.30 0.32 0.64
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.38)
Ideological Diversity 1.60∗ 1.66∗ 1.66∗ 0.27
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31)
Party Competition 0.46∗ 0.45 0.63
in Government (0.23) (0.23) (0.47)
Electoral Competition 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Upper Chamber -0.13∗ -0.14∗ -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Term Limits 0.03 0.03 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
District Population 0.13∗ 0.15∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Racial Diversity X -0.04
District Population (0.10)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Random Effects No No No Yes
Constant -1.26∗ -1.01∗ -1.01∗ 0.03
(0.24) (0.36) (0.36) (0.64)
Observations 267 267 267 267
Adj. R2 0.47 0.62 0.62 –
BIC 235.21 169.10 174.55 15.84
Note: ∗p<0.05. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1 through 3 present OLS regression models and classic standard
errors. Model 4 presents a multilevel model with state random effects and bootstrap clustered standard errors.
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Table C.7: Diversity and Chamber Polarization using Log-Transformed Dependent Variable
Dependent variable:
log(Interparty Distance)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.33∗ 0.21 0.31∗ 0.46
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.31)
Ideological Diversity 1.51∗ 1.53∗ 1.53∗ 0.36∗
(0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.13)
Party Competition 0.34 0.26 0.54
in Government (0.22) (0.23) (0.47)
Electoral Competition 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Upper Chamber -0.11∗ -0.14∗ -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Term Limits -0.02 -0.02 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
District Population 0.11∗ 0.23∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
Racial Diversity X -0.02
District Population (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Random Effects No No No Yes
Constant -1.27∗ -1.91∗ -1.91∗ -1.06∗
(0.25) (0.29) (0.29) (0.53)
Observations 246 246 246 246
Adj. R2 0.14 0.37 0.37 –
BIC 150.27 98.39 100.16 -179.95
Note: ∗p<0.05. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1 through 3 present OLS regression models and classic standard
errors. Model 4 presents a multilevel model with state random effects and bootstrap clustered standard errors.
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Table C.8: Diversity and Chamber Polarization with Missing Data Imputed
Dependent variable:
Interparty Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Diversity 0.62∗ 0.43 0.49 0.76
(0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.45)
Ideological Diversity 2.24∗ 2.15∗ 2.16∗ 0.91∗
(0.24) (0.32) (0.32) (0.41)
Party Competition 0.30 0.26 0.44
in Government (0.33) (0.34) (0.66)
Electoral Competition 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Upper Chamber -0.17∗ -0.19∗ -0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Term Limits 0.06 0.05 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14)
District Population 0.17∗ 0.24∗ 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
Racial Diversity X -0.11
District Population (0.12)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Random Effects No No No Yes
Constant -0.96∗ -1.70∗ -1.71∗ -0.75
(0.39) (0.49) (0.49) (0.80)
Observations 294 294 294 294
Note: ∗p<0.05. Significance tests are two-tailed. Models 1 through 3 present OLS regression models and classic standard
errors. Model 4 presents a multilevel model with state random effects and bootstrap clustered standard errors.
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Matching Analysis
I rely upon Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012) to pair observations.
According to Blackwell et al. (2009), CEM can also be used to isolate the effects of continuous
treatment variables. In these cases, observations are matched on coarsened covariates, but dummy
variables indicating the bins, or blocks, into which each observation falls are used as the control
variables. This model design is equivalent to that in a randomized block experiment, in which similar
observations are matched within homogeneous subgroups so that researchers can estimate treatment
effects by leveraging variance across subgroups (Imai, King, and Stuart, 2008; Imai, King, and Nall,
2009).
Table C.9 presents a description of the matching analysis. The lefthand panel describes the
covariates used for matching, as well as the thresholds defined for coarsening the variables. All
covariates chosen for inclusion correlate with racial diversity at |r| ≥ 0.05. In combination, the
coarsened covariates create eight blocks. The righthand panel shows the results of an OLS regression
of the dependent variable, interparty distance, on the independent variable racial diversity and a set
of dummy variables indicating each block. The first model shows that, controlling for the nuisance
factors, racial diversity is positively and statistically significantly associated with interparty distance.
The second model shows that result persists even when ideological diversity is included in the model.
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Table C.9: Coarsened Exact Matching Analysis
Variable Name Coarsening Thresholds
Electoral Competition 44; 55
District Population 20; 60
Number of Blocks Created: 8
DV: Interparty Distance
Racial Diversity 0.40∗ 0.40∗
(0.16) (0.15)
Ideological Diversity 1.57∗
(0.24)
Block 2 – –
Block 3 0.09 0.11
(0.09) (0.08)
Block 4 0.21 0.20
(0.32) (0.30)
Block 5 0.16∗ 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Block 6 0.28∗ 0.34∗
(0.10) (0.09)
Block 7 0.71∗ 0.69∗
(0.19) (0.17)
Block 8 0.27∗ 0.26∗
(0.10) (0.09)
Constant 0.13 -1.39∗
(0.08) (0.24)
Observations 246 246
Adj. R2 0.11 0.24
Left: List of covariates used for coarsened exact matching. Right: Regression analysis on matched
variables. ∗p<0.05. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
No observations fall in Block 2.
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